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Promoting technological innovation is important to the U.S. econ-
omy, as evidenced by the enactment of the America Invents Act
three years ago.1 But what if Congress had also passed a law to
promote innovation based on scientific and technological research,
but that law was stifling innovation instead? This is the concern
that various critics have expressed about the Patent and Trade-
mark Law Amendments Act of 1980, otherwise known as the Bayh-
Dole Act. 2 The Bayh-Dole Act allows universities and other recipi-
ents of federal research funds to retain the patent rights to their
research on the premise that this will foster further development
and commercialization of research that would otherwise be un-
derutilized. 3 Critics have challenged this premise, however, argu-
ing that Bayh-Dole is at best unnecessary and at worst a drag on
innovation. 4 The Bayh-Dole Act has thus become somewhat con-
troversial, particularly with regard to patents on federally funded
research performed at universities. As this article explains, how-
ever, the answer to the question of whether university patenting
under Bayh-Dole is good or bad is that it depends: sometimes uni-
versity patenting is helpful, sometimes it is harmful, but most of
the time, it is just irrelevant.
In this regard, the debate over the Bayh-Dole Act touches on age-
old issues about the patent system in general and the modern-day
role of universities within that system. The patent system is popu-
larly characterized as incentivizing investments in research and de-
velopment ("R&D") by providing an opportunity to appropriate the
returns on that investment.5 This characterization has been chal-
1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
2. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212).
3. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Tech-
nology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1664 (1996); Brett
Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and
Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 395-400 (2000); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 97-98
(1999).
4. E.g., Dovid A. Kanarfogel, Rectifying the Missing Costs of University Patent Practices:
Addressing Bayh-Dole Criticisms Through Faculty Involvement, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 533 (2009); see also text accompanying notes 115-122, 158-235, infra.
5. See, e.g., David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The
Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 184 (2009).
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lenged, however, and many question the link between patent pro-
tection and investments in R&D.6 Alternative explanations for the
patent system-that patents incentivize not so much investments
in R&D itself but, rather, in commercializing its application7 or that
patent exclusivity does not incentivize invention itself but rather
only races to be the first to invent 8 -have also been questioned. 9
And if universities are institutions of higher learning driven not by
profit but by a mission to serve the public, and if their research is
typically funded through grants, not through appropriating patent
returns, what need do they have for patent protection? Incentiviz-
ing universities to invest in R&D is not the point of the Bayh-Dole
Act, however.1 0 The Bayh-Dole Act was designed to promote the
use and commercialization of inventions after R&D is complete, but
even so, universities are generally not commercial actors with ei-
ther expertise or interest in marketing and commercialization.1 1
Rather, university research traditionally has been thought to bene-
fit society the most when dedicated to the public domain to be used
freely by others. 12 How, then, can the Bayh-Dole Act foster the use
of federally funded research by allowing and even encouraging uni-
versities and other funding recipients to retain patent exclusivity
over that research, rather than dedicating it to the public domain?
The reality is that, like the patent system itself, the effect of the
Bayh-Dole Act is not homogeneous. Whether university patenting
under Bayh-Dole promotes or frustrates subsequent innovation or
whether it has any role at all depends not only on the technology in
question but also on its developmental stage, industry familiarity
6. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1211, 1239 (2012); John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patent-
ability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 619-20 (2009); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages
or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski,
3 CASE W. RESERVE J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 45 (2012).
7. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1065 (2007); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341
(2010).
8. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
439 (2004) (arguing that patents inspire socially beneficial patent races); Mark A. Lemley,
The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012) (same).
9. See Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Con-
ditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 7752, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (noting that most
firms patent for reasons other than profit from commercialization or licensing).
10. Rai, supra note 3, at 97.
11. See, e.g., DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION:
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN
THE UNITED STATES 88-91 (2004).
12. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1727.
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with the technology at issue, and multiple other factors. This arti-
cle examines the three main roles that university patenting may
play and, more importantly, the conditions under which university
patenting is likely to assume each role.
First is the role that university patenting and Bayh-Dole were
intended to play-that of encouraging development and commer-
cialization of university research. 13 In some albeit limited circum-
stances, university patenting under Bayh-Dole may play a salutary
role by affording forward protection for downstream development
stages that might otherwise be copied by others. A somewhat more
likely alternative possibility is that university patenting covers in-
ventions funded not just by federal research funds but also by pri-
vate industry funding and, as such, helps to incentivize investment
of private funds in university research. In some instances, univer-
sity patents, like all patents, may also act to prevent under-devel-
opment of technologies that have rival-in-use applications.
A second role that university patenting may play is, as many crit-
ics suggest, to hinder rather than promote downstream use and de-
velopment of federally funded research. Scholars such as Profes-
sors Michael Heller, Rebecca Eisenberg, and Mark Lemley have at
various times expressed concern that Bayh-Dole-enabled patents
may create anticommons that stunt development in biotechnology,
nanotechnology, and other university-based research areas.14 It is
true that patents on foundational technologies are likely to create
bottlenecks that interfere with development of downstream appli-
cations. For a variety of reasons, however, anticommons and other
hold-up problems are otherwise not as prevalent as many believe.
The third and most likely role for Bayh-Dole patents is that they
are simply irrelevant. As this author has written elsewhere,15 in
the "science-based" fields typically the focus of university research,
technological and economic uncertainty, long development cycles,
tacit knowledge, lack of funding, and even regulatory and safety is-
sues are much more significant and rate-limiting factors than pa-
tents are to commercialization. 16 Indeed, most university patents
13. Id. at 1664; Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships,
and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1503, 1508 (2012).
14. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, Patenting
Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601 (2005).
15. Emily Michiko Morris, The Irrelevance of Nanotechnology Patents, _ NEV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016).
16. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 197-205 (1987).
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in these fields simply lie dormant.1 7 Most importantly, Bayh-Dole
does not obligate universities to patent all of their eligible research,
and most university research is not patented at all, as universities
rationally find the costs of patenting far outweigh any potential
benefits.18
This article therefore examines the characteristics that may in-
fluence what role the Bayh-Dole Act and university patenting on
upstream technologies plays in the development of their down-
stream applications. The discussion here is not meant to be exhaus-
tive, and will give only an overview of how university patenting can
affect downstream innovation. Part I reviews the stated purpose of
the Bayh-Dole Act and how it fits into the various theories of how
not only the patent system but also university-based research fos-
ters invention and innovation. Part I goes on to take a closer look
at the commercialization theory of patenting in particular, pointing
out that patents on university research may in fact facilitate down-
stream development in circumstances where other means of appro-
priating returns on downstream investments would otherwise be
lacking. Part II shifts the focus and examines the risk that up-
stream patenting by universities may instead retard downstream
development by increasing the transaction costs and decreasing the
returns on commercialization investments. Part II explains that,
despite the concerns expressed by many critics of the Bayh-Dole
Act, the risk of anticommons or other hold-up problems is actually
not as great as they fear, although hold-ups may be a concern for
truly foundational technologies or for technologies that are cumu-
lative or complementary. Finally, Part III explains that, for what
is by far the most sizable portion of university research, patents are
simply immaterial. In the science-based technologies commonly the
subject of university research, other factors play a much more dom-
inant role in determining the likelihood that university research
can ultimately be further developed for commercialization, if that
research is in fact even patented.
17. Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in
Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 259 (2006); Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry
Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Devel-
oping Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 359-60 (2009); Brian J.
Love, Do University Patents Pay Offt Evidence from a Survey of University Inventors in Com-
puter Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285, 308-12 (2014).
18. David E. Adelman, The Irrationality of Speculative Gene Patents, in 16 ADVANCES IN
THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 123, pt. III. B (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005).
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I. UNIVERSITY PATENTING UNDER BAYH-DOLE AS BENEFICIAL
The Bayh-Dole Act addresses patenting and commercialization
of federally funded research, and its effects are multifold. First,
Bayh-Dole standardizes federal agency policies on funded research,
rather than leaving it to the individual agencies to dictate whether
funded research may be patented and if so, who held the rights. 19
Second, Bayh-Dole allows the government to retain a non-exclu-
sive, paid-up license to practice the patented invention and to
"march in" and take steps if the grant recipient does not make rea-
sonable efforts to bring the patented invention to the public.20 To
date, however, no federal agency has exercised its march-in rights
under the Act. 21 Third, Bayh-Dole prevents exploitation of U.S.-
funded research by non-U.S. entities by requiring that manufactur-
ing under subject patents occurs "substantially in the United
States."22 Much along the same lines, the Bayh-Dole Act also fa-
vors small businesses, as the Act expresses a preference for patent
licensing to small businesses where feasible. 23
Bayh-Dole's main and most oft-noted purpose is to foster tech-
nology transfer of government-funded "upstream" research for de-
velopment into "downstream" applications.24 Prior to the enact-
ment of Bayh-Dole, the perception was that much of this research
could have had significant practical value and benefit to the public
but that private industry was reluctant to invest in developing and
commercializing it.25 In particular, the perception was that re-
search was particularly prone to underutilization if it was either
unpatented or if the government held the patent rights, and that
patent rights were often important to either grant recipients or
19. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1671; Frischmann, supra note 3, at 398.
20. 35 U.S.C. §§ 202(c)(2), 203 (2012).
21. Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price Con-
trols? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon Pa-
tents Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631 pas-
sim (2001); Frischmann, supra note 3, at 403.
22. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 32, 207
(Aline C. Flower ed., 2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter BNA]; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, A Technology
Policy Perspective on the NIH Gene Patenting Controversy, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 633, 648 (1994).
How much this provision benefits the U.S. economy is unclear, and the provision may con-
tradict the free-trade approach of current U.S. policy in international trade. Id. at 651.
23. BNA, supra note 22, at 33-34, 207.
24. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1664; Lee, supra note 13, at 1508; Rai, supra note 3, at
97-98.
25. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1680-90 (summarizing the data and interviews on
which this perception was based).
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downstream licensees. 26 The U.S. government responded by en-
couraging funded contractors to retain the patent rights to their re-
search in hopes that this would help incentivize its development. 27
In the wake of the Bayh-Dole Act, university patenting increased
dramatically,28 and the amount universities invest in patenting has
risen.29
A. Bayh-Dole and the Reward Theory of Patenting
How patents on federally funded research remedy the perceived
under-development of that research, however, is not immediately
obvious. Patent exclusivity is often described as an incentive to in-
vest in technological R&D by allowing investors to appropriate re-
turns ex post through supracompetitive prices for access to the cov-
ered invention. 30 This "reward" theory of patenting seems wholly
inconsistent with the Bayh-Dole Act, however.31 Research funded
ex ante through government or other monies does not require the
incentive of returns from patent exclusivity. 3 2 In fact, the type of
research and development that governments are most likely to fund
ex ante are exactly those that the prospect of patent exclusivity is
26. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 3; F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001).
27. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 3; Lee, supra note 13; Michael S. Mireles, Adop-
tion of the Bayh-Dole Act in Developed Countries: Added Pressure for a Broad Research Ex-
emption in the United States?, 59 ME. L. REV. 259, 260 (2007). A related statute, the Steven-
son-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, directs federal agencies to transfer federally
owned technology to both state and local governments and to the private sector. As later
amended and expanded, Stevenson-Wydler also now allows government-funded and oper-
ated laboratories to enter into cooperative research and development agreements ("CRA-
DAs") with private contractors and to license, exclusively or non-exclusively, or even to assign
title to, any resulting patents. Arno & Davis, supra note 21, at 644 (referring to amendments
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986); Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1707-08 (referring also
to the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995); Wei-Lin Wang, A Criti-
cal Study on the Cooperative Research and Development Agreements of U.S. Federal Labora-
tories: Technology Commercialization and the Public Interest, 9 NANOTECH. L. & BUs. 50, 50,
54-55 (2012).
28. David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 985, 989 (2005); Mireles, supra note 27, at 264.
29. Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab: Why Universities Should Take a
Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. REV. 407, 419 (2007) (and sources
cited therein) (noting that university expenditures on patenting increased almost six-fold
between 1991 and 2004).
30. Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 648; Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents,
Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 198 (1980).
31. Brett Frischmann, Commercializing University Research Systems in Economic Per-
spectives: A View from the Demand Side, in 16 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 155, 175 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005);
McFetridge & Smith, supra note 30, at 198.
32. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1666-67; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 300-01 (2003).
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unable to incentivize. Basic research, particularly in complex and
unpredictable fields such as biotechnology and nanotechnology, is
often too uncertain and distant in value to be attractive invest-
ments for private firms, even when protected by patents. 33 Govern-
ments address this market failure by using tax dollars to subsidize
research of sufficient academic or other social value. To allow fund
recipients to then patent their research would in effect charge the
public twice: once in the form of tax-supported government research
grants ex ante and again in the form of supracompetitive market
prices expost.3 4
Although patent protection is unnecessary to incentivize fully
funded university research, not all university research is funded
solely through government grants. Modern-day university research
is increasingly sponsored by both the government and private in-
dustry, particularly in engineering, the applied sciences, and some
areas of biotechnology. 35 Although private industry and investors
are generally not interested in university-initiated research and
early-stage inventions, 36 relationships between universities and in-
dustry have become more common post Bayh-Dole, 37 and private
firms have increased their sponsorship of university research on
projects of mutual interest 38 such that private funding of biomedical
research long ago outpaced government funding. 39 Private out-
sourcing to university laboratories is particularly likely when the
research at issue is thought to be of low or uncertain commercial
33. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1698-99; Frischmann, supra note 3, at 352.
34. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1666; Frischmann, supra note 3, at 347; Mireles, supra
note 27, at 261; Jacob H. Rooksby, University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation, 10
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 631 (2011).
35. See Wesley M. Cohen et al., Links and Impacts: The Influence of Public Research on
Industrial R&D, 48 MGMT. SCI. 1 (2002); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns
from Industrial Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783.
36. See Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing
of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 245 (2001); Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard
R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES
1031, 1040 (1998).
37. See, e.g., David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and
Industry in the Life Sciences-An Industry Survey, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 368, 369 (1996)
(finding that 9 0% of U.S. life-sciences companies have some relationship with academia);
Wesley M. Cohen et al., Industry and the Academy: Uneasy Partners in the Cause of Techno-
logical Advance, in CHALLENGES TO RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 171, 179-83 (Richard G. Noll
ed., 1998); Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2177 (2009).
38. Blumenthal et al., supra note 37, at 369, 371-72; Cohen et al., supra note 37, at 183.
39. Adelman, supra note 28, at 989-90 (noting that private funding has constituted the
majority of biomedical research funding since 1992); see also Blumenthal et al., supra note
37, at 369 (quantifying industry financial support for university biotech research in early
1990s).
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potential or too general in application4 0 or, conversely, where the
research can be readily commercialized. 4 1 Not surprisingly, private
firms sponsoring such university research typically demand exclu-
sive licenses to any resulting patents. 4 2
In other words, in cases where university research is industry-
sponsored, even in part, Bayh-Dole actually aligns with the reward
theory of patenting. Unlike government agencies, private actors
presumably invest in R&D only if they can prevent competitors
from free-riding on those investments. By protecting private in-
vestments, patents may help to incentivize industry sponsorship of
university research in much the same way patents are thought to
help incentivize investment in purely private R&D. Furthermore,
to the extent that patenting university research can attract private
funding to supplement or even supplant government funding,
Bayh-Dole may be beneficial. 4 3 In fact, one of the motivations be-
hind Bayh-Dole was to increase private funding of academic and
other government-funded research by offering the lure of patent ex-
clusivity. 4 4 Evidence that the Act has had the desired effect is ap-
parent in the rise of industry funding for university research over
the last thirty years, roughly concurrent with the time period since
passage of Bayh-Dole. 45 On the other hand, some studies suggest
that Bayh-Dole was the result of increases in industry co-funding
of university research after World War II and the consequent de-
mand for patent protection. 46
40. See Riccardo Fini & Nicola Lacetera, Different Yokes for Different Folks: Individual
Preferences, Institutional Logics, and the Commercialization of Academic Research, in 21
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
SPANNING BOUNDARIES AND DISCIPLINES: UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION IN
THE IDEA AGE 1, 10-12 (2010) (and sources cited therein).
41. Id. at 10.
42. Jensen & Thursby, supra note 36, at 252.
43. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1700; Richard R. Nelson, The Market Economy, and the
Scientific Commons, 33 RES. POL'Y 455, 463 (2004).
44. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1700; Greenbaum, supra note 17, at 343. Although Bayh-
Dole does not allow universities to assign the rights to their patents ahead of time if the
covered research is also funded in part through federal funds (because Bayh-Dole reserves
the government's right to veto such transfers), the potential to patent and exclusively license
the research is made clear under the Act. Sean M. O'Connor, Intellectual Property Rights
and Stem Cell Research: Who Owns the Medical Breakthroughs?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 665,
669, 687 (2005).
45. BNA, supra note 22, at 236-38; Cohen et al., supra note 37, at 183; Fini & Lacetera,
supra note 40, at 10-11.
46. Jeannette Colyvas et al., How Do University Inventions Get into Practice?, 48 MGMT.
SCI. 61, 63 (2002); David C. Mowery, The Bayh-Dole Act and High Technology Entrepreneur-
ship in U.S. Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else?, in 16 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY
OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 39, 51 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005). But see
Donald Siegel et al., Assessing the Impact of Organizational Practices on the Productivity of
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To say that patenting under Bayh-Dole may attract private spon-
sorship of university research nevertheless begs the question: Why
should public funds continue to be used for such research? One pos-
sibility is that for at least some percentage of industry-sponsored
university research, the combination of both government funding
and patent protection is necessary.47 The potential for patent ex-
clusivity helps attract private investment, but the addition of some
level of government funding may be needed to reduce the risk of
such investments, further incentivizing private funding. 48 The pro-
portion of university research to which this combination effect
might apply is likely small at this time, but private funding of uni-
versity research continues to expand in magnitude. 49
B. Bayh-Dole and the Commercialization Theory of Patenting
That being said, the main goal of the Bayh-Dole Act was not to
incentivize basic research but rather to stimulate its development
into practical applications. For many years prior to the enactment
of Bayh-Dole, the perception was that too little of government-
funded research benefitted the public in anything other than a
purely academic sense, and permitting grant recipients to patent
their research was thought to encourage the further development
and research necessary to bring an invention to the market.5 0 This
latter function attributed to the patent system obviously does not
reflect the traditional reward theory but rather the more recent
"commercialization" theory of patenting.
The commercialization theory of patenting recognizes that even
after investment in R&D has successfully resulted in a patentable
invention, significant further investments may be required to de-
velop the invention into a marketable commodity. For example, the
invention may require significant further investment in technical
refinements, safety testing, evaluation and development for com-
patibility with other technologies. Construction of manufacturing
resources and distribution channels, education and training, study
University Technology Transfer Offices: An Exploratory Study, 32 RES. POL'Y 27, 31 (2003)
(describing "surge" in university patenting and licensing).
47. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimenta-
tion, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 366-78 (2008).
48. Suzanne Scotchmer, Patents in the University: Priming the Pump and Crowding Out,
61 J. INDUS. ECON. 817, 840 (2013).
49. BNA, supra note 22, at 235-38; Fini & Lacetera, supra note 40, at 10-11.
50. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1669; Lee, supra note 13, at 1508; Rai, supra note 3, at
97-98.
90 Vol. 54
The Many Faces of Bayh-Dole
of consumer preferences, and marketing may also require consider-
able financial outlays.5 1 Although inventive ideas themselves are
not rivalrous, investments in them are,52 and private downstream
developers will want exclusive rights to technologies as a means of
protecting their commercialization efforts. 53 For inventions that re-
quire significant further development for commercial exploitation,
patents may help establish private appropriability over those later
investments. 54 Regardless of whether patent protection can incen-
tivize R&D already funded through other means, patent exclusivity
may thus help to incentivize its subsequent commercialization.55 In
this way, patent protection of government-funded research "pays
for" additional value beyond initial invention costs.
The commercialization theory of patenting takes a page from Ed-
mund Kitch's seminal prospect theory. Kitch likens patents to
property rights over mining or fishing prospects. He argues that,
just as exclusive fishing and mining rights to develop prospects gen-
erate socially optimal fishing and mining efforts, patents provide
exclusive rights to develop inventive concepts in socially optimal
ways.5 6 If they were instead left to the common pool-or in the case
of inventive concepts, to the public domain-these prospects would
be underutilized.5 7 Specifically, Kitch's prospect theory of patent-
ing postulates that granting broad patent rights early, after inven-
tion but before commercialization, enables the patent holder to pro-
tect investments in developing the covered invention from free-rid-
ing or even duplication by competitors, and to coordinate develop-
ment with others possessing complementary resources.5 8
Nonetheless, the importance of patents in stimulating down-
stream development is a matter of debate. Both Kitch's prospect
theory and the commercialization theory of patenting suffer from a
number of flaws, primarily because both theories overestimate the
power of patents to facilitate commercialization. 5 9
51. Abramowicz, supra note 7passim; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of
Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1036-37 (1989);
Kieff, supra note 26, at 707-12.
52. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 276 (1977).
53. BNA, supra note 22, at 252.
54. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1040-42.
55. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1669.
56. Kitch, supra note 52, at 274-75.
57. Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 1040-41.
58. Kitch, supra note 52, at 276-80; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Com-
plex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871 (1990).
59. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 8 passim.
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As a first matter, it is not clear that a single patent holder or
licensee is always in the best position to decide or even to recognize
how to develop an inventive "prospect."60 For many inventions, par-
ticularly the embryonic technologies most likely to arise from basic
university research, how to commercialize the technology and the
ways in which it may become relevant are often uncertain and even
unforeseeable. Although the faculty researcher who invented the
patented concept may have ideas for its application, neither faculty
nor their universities are commercial actors with expertise in iden-
tifying new technological and market niches. 61 Universities may
instead license their patents to industry for commercialization, but
a single firm with exclusive rights is unlikely to possess the re-
sources necessary to identify and pursue all viable applications for
such early-stage technologies. 62 Free access to the technology in-
stead will allow a broader range of potential downstream applica-
tions to be developed, without the transaction costs of having to ne-
gotiate a license with a patent holder. 63
Second, even assuming that exclusive rights to an invention were
necessary for commercialization, it is not clear that patents provide
adequate protection for commercialization costs. Patents can pro-
tect commercialization investments only if others cannot copy those
commercialization efforts without infringing the upstream patent.
For example, commercialization of a patented invention often in-
volves creation of or coordination with other complementary tech-
nologies and improvements to create a marketable product. 64 If
competitors can find a workable substitute for the patented part,
they can copy the remainder of product without infringing the pa-
tent. Alternatively, if the patented invention can easily be designed
around, patent protection does little to preclude return-dissipating
competition. 65 Where the patented invention is used only for R&D
in creating new products, and is therefore no longer necessary once
60. Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 843, 863, 872.
61. See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 11, at 91.
62. Id. On the other hand, some argue that patent holders, after having already made
the often sizeable investment to invent, may be highly likely to make the further investments
necessary to develop their inventions. Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 1068.
63. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 1049-50 (1997); Nelson, supra note 43, at 463-67. For further discussion
of the transaction costs created by patent exclusivity, see text accompanying notes 175-76,
infra.
64. See Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 1087-88; Lemley, supra note 8, at 740.
65. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 40-41
(2000); cf. Ashish Arora et al., R&D and the Patent Premium, 26 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 1153,
1164-65 (noting that the value of a patent may depend on the ease with which it can be
"invent[ed] around").
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that product has been developed, patent protection is almost use-
less in providing appropriability over the downstream product.66
Finally, timing is important as well. The U.S. Patent & Trade-
mark Office's ("PTO's") examination of patent applications often
lasts for years, and the decision whether to issue the patents is of-
ten made long after commercialization and market entry costs have
already been incurred.6 7 Yet other inventions take so long to com-
mercialize that the relevant patents expire soon after or even before
commercialization has been achieved. 68 In none of these cases can
patent protection be said to provide adequate incentive for commer-
cialization.
Likewise, even assuming some form of exclusivity were necessary
for commercialization, in many-and some would argue most 69 -
instances, non-patent exclusivity already protects commercializa-
tion efforts. 70 Many technologies enjoy effective exclusivity for some
period of time because of exclusive access to tacit knowledge or re-
search tools and materials; because competitors are unwilling to as-
sume the high fixed capital cost of establishing manufacturing fa-
cilities; because of the reputational benefits of being the original
innovator; and so on. 71 These factors are all first-mover advantages
that can supply some degree of exclusivity that delay competitors
from entering the market. 72 Similarly, branding and marketing can
also help firms maintain an edge in the market and earn returns
sufficient to compensate for investments in downstream develop-
ment.73
Last but not least, firms can also seek more direct protection for
their commercialization investments. Many downstream develop-
ments, combinations with complementary technologies, and im-
provements are themselves separately patentable inventions in
whole or in part; in these cases, patent protection of the original,
upstream invention served no purpose other than to hinder its
downstream commercialization. 7 4 Downstream commercialization
66. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Limiting the Role of Patents in Technology Transfer, 5 J. NIH
RES. 20, 22 (1993).
67. Lemley, supra note 8, at 740.
68. Id.; Sichelman, supra note 7, at 365.
69. Frischmann, supra note 31, at 171.
70. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1048.
71. Mowery, supra note 46, at 57.
72. Frischmann, supra note 3, at 368.
73. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1618 (2003).
74. Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 643; Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1041; Rai &
Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 302; Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Deline-
ating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1745 (2007).
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efforts that do not yield patentable inventions might be protectable
through trade secrecy75 (or, in the case of many pharmaceuticals,
through various regulatory exclusivities granted by the Food and
Drug Administration76 ). Many upstream inventions therefore do
not need patent exclusivity in order to attract commercialization
investments.77
Given that (as discussed in more detail in the next section78) pa-
tent rights can lead to deadweight losses, transaction costs, and un-
der-development, among other problems, it would seem better to err
on the side of denying patents to university research and other gov-
ernment-funded, basic research. University research patents in
many cases are, at best, redundant or irrelevant and, at worst,
counter-productive. As Kitch himself noted, appropriate upstream
patent protections depend not just on pre-invention conditions but
also on the anticipated post-invention environment: covering down-
stream developments can boost the incentive effect of upstream pa-
tenting, but by the same token, can also increase the social costs of
such patenting in terms of deterring downstream development by
others. 79 The Bayh-Dole Act and upstream patenting of basic uni-
versity research may nonetheless foster commercialization in some,
albeit limited, circumstances.
A first possible scenario occurs when downstream development
cannot be protected through patents or other means of exerting ex-
clusivity.8 0 When copying costs are low but appropriability is un-
certain, short-lived, or unavailable, private firms will be deterred
from investing in commercialization, especially if the commerciali-
zation process is resource-intensive.8 1  In this situation an up-
stream patent may be able to provide some level of appropriability
for downstream development efforts.82 Patents on upstream inven-
tions may also provide broader protection than patents on down-
stream developments when the latter are too narrow to cover all
commercialization costs.
75. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1039.
76. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 345, pt. III (2007) (referring to these regulatory exclusivities as "pseudo-
patents").
77. Contra Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1048.
78. See discussion infra Part II.
79. Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 843.
80. Cf. Sichelman, supra note 7 (discussing the commercialization theory of patents); see
also Colyvas et al., supra note 46, at 65 (noting that firms often will develop upstream re-
search even without exclusive rights if they anticipate that they can otherwise appropriate
returns on their downstream applications).
81. Kieff, supra note 26, at 708-09; Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1041.
82. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1040.
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The primary type of commercialization cost that is difficult to pro-
tect is information; information can be quite costly to collect but is
almost costless to copy. For example, identifying a market and con-
sumer demand and refining an invention accordingly is often very
important, especially for new technologies, and yet costly. 83 Trade
secrecy can sometimes offer protection, but information such as
market definitions and consumer preferences are often self-reveal-
ing and impossible to maintain as secrets. 8 4 Competitors can easily
free ride on other types of market information as well. Investments
in educating distributors and consumers about the new technology
benefits not only first movers but also second and later market en-
trants by effectively reducing the cost of subsequent market entry.85
Moreover, because commercializing technologies in biotechnology,
nanotechnology, and other university-derived fields is typically
complex and unpredictable, with high failure rates and long devel-
opment cycles, commercialization is costly and high-risk but low in
expected value.8 6 Private capital is therefore generally reluctant to
invest in commercializing new university-based technologies .87
This reluctance dissipates, however, as the market for the new tech-
nology becomes more established, giving later market entrants the
benefit of declining capital costs over time.88
Other types of commercialization efforts suffer from similar diffi-
culties in appropriability. Applications of patented university re-
search may not themselves be patentable: examples include meth-
ods of medical treatment based on biotechnology research, or com-
puter software and interfaces for newly invented hardware, both of
which may be unpatentable subject matter under recent Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit precedent. 8 9 Improvements on univer-
sity research for the purposes of commercialization may also be un-
patentable for failure to meet the statutory requirements for non-
83. See generally Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 47; Kieff, supra note 26; Sichelman,
supra note 7.
84. Sichelman, supra note 7, at 352.
85. Kieff, supra note 26, at 709.
86. Heather Hamme Ramirez, Comment, Defending the Privatization of Research Tools:
An Examination of the "Tragedy of the Anticommons" in Biotechnology Research and Devel-
opment, 53 EMORY L.J. 359, 378 (2004).
87. Frank T. Rothaermel & Marie Thursby, Incubator Firm Failure or Graduation? The
Role of University Linkages, 34 RES. POL'Y 1076, 1077-78 (2005). For more on science-based
technologies, see text accompanying notes 95-99, infra.
88. Kieff, supra note 26, at 709.
89. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2351-52 (2014) (holding software-
based business transactions to be unpatentable subject matter); Mayo Collaborative Serv. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) (holding method of treatment based
solely on medical knowledge to be unpatentable subject matter).
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obviousness. 90 Software, diagnostic databases, and even improve-
ments can be kept as trade secrets, but trade secrecy does not pro-
tect against independent creation or reverse engineering. 91
Moreover, because of their high-risk profiles, the expected value
of commercializing new university-based technologies is often low
for the first market entrant. 92 Even small reductions in the appro-
priability of commercialization returns could therefore deter mar-
ket introduction, given the often steep costs of commercializing uni-
versity-based technologies.93 Upstream patents on university re-
search can thus help mediate the risk of underutilization by provid-
ing forward protections over downstream development. Upstream
patents can reduce the need for patents on downstream develop-
ments, but again, only if the upstream patents are of sufficient
breadth that others cannot copy the downstream developments
without infringing. 94
The extent to which commercialization of university research
needs the forward protections of upstream patenting is likely lim-
ited, however. University research quite often focuses on science-
based fields such as the modern fields of biotechnology and nano-
technology. 95 In science-based (or "research-based") technologies,
advances come from outside the norm of private industry, and de-
rive instead from basic research and "a continuing flow of new sci-
entific understandings and techniques largely emanating from uni-
versity research." 96 Because they are driven by the desire for scien-
tific knowledge rather than direct practical application, science-
based technologies are typically embryonic and usually involve
90. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incen-
tive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 66 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2002);
see also 35 U.S.C. § 103 (prohibiting patents on inventions that "would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art").
91. Frischmann, supra note 3, at 368; Kieff, supra note 26, at 728.
92. Mowery, supra note 46, at 44-45 (and sources cited therein); Ramirez, supra note 86,
at 378.
93. Kieff, supra note 26, at 724 (noting the exceptionally high costs of commercializing
biotechnology); Rothaermel & Thursby, supra note 87, at 1078.
94. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 90, at 66.
95. Martin Meyer, Socio-Economic Research on Nanoscale Science and Technology: A Eu-
ropean Overview and Illustration, in SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS OF NANOSCIENCE AND
NANOTECHNOLOGY 217, 231 (Mihail C. Roco & William Sims Bainbridge eds., Nat'l Sci.
Found. 2001) (nanotechnology as science-based); Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 904-05
(biotechnology as science-based); William J. Simmons, Nanotechnology as a Nascent Techno-
logical Model for Immediate Substantive United States and Japan Patent Law Harmoniza-
tion, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 753, 819 (2007) (nanotechnology). Other historically science-
based fields include catalysis, superconductivity, and semiconductors. Merges & Nelson, su-
pra note 58, at 904-05.
96. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1047; see Nelson, supra note 43, at 457-59.
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multiple development stages. 97 These stages are frequently techno-
logically significant and patentable or otherwise protectable in their
own right. 98 Forward protection from upstream patenting on the
initial university research stage is therefore likely unnecessary or
even counter-productive, as discussed in further detail in Parts II
and III. University research in engineering or other applied sci-
ences, on the other hand, may be less likely to enjoy secondary pa-
tentability or first-mover advantages, as research in these areas
tends to be much less rudimentary and involves fewer technological
steps for commercialization. 99 University research in the applied
sciences may also more frequently enjoy industry funding. For both
of these reasons, patents on university research may be more im-
portant and beneficial in these areas.
A second possible scenario in which upstream patents may facil-
itate downstream development occurs when university research is
"rival-in-use." Rival-in-use refers to upstream technologies that
can be used to develop downstream applications that compete di-
rectly with one another.1 00 If a firm does not have some type of ex-
clusivity over the downstream application, the firm may opt not to
enter the market at all, especially if subsequent market entrants
might be able to free-ride on some of the firm's commercialization
efforts; in a worst-case scenario, no one would have the incentive to
develop the application at all.10 1 If on the other hand, the rival-in-
use technology is patented and licensed exclusively to a down-
stream developer, the application could be commercialized without
fear of returns being competed away by others. 102 In this way, the
rival-in-use problem is simply a variation on the commercialization
theory, under which the forward protection of an upstream patent
helps to incentivize development of downstream applications not
97. Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 880, 907-08; Mowery, supra note 46, at 44-45
(and sources cited therein); Nelson, supra note 43, at 457-59; Ramirez, supra note 86, at 378.
98. Colyvas et al., supra note 46, at 66; Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1041;
Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 880, 907-08; Rothaermel & Thursby, supra note 87, at
1078.
99. David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University-
Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments?, 30 J. TECH.
TRANSFER 115, 116 (2005).
100. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21sT CENTURY 72-73 (Ste-
phen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter A PATENT SYSTEM]; John P. Walsh et al., Effects
of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 289, 331 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
101. Arno & Davis, supra note 21, at 640-41; Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 644.
102. See Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 644; McFetridge & Smith, supra note 30, at 198;
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE




otherwise protected. Again, however, most science-based technolo-
gies enjoy the benefit of some form of downstream exclusivity,
whether it be secondary patents, first-mover advantages, or exclu-
sive access to resources. These types of exclusivities are usually
sufficient to protect commercialization investments. 103
In fact, university research may occasionally give rise to patent
races, in which firms vie to be the first to file for patent rights over
the same downstream application. 1 0 4 Patent races can create utility
by spurring more rapid invention than might otherwise have oc-
curred, and the sooner that firms complete their inventions and re-
ceive their patents, the sooner those patents expire and release the
invention to the public.105 If firms invest too heavily in being first,
however, they dissipate the social gains from early invention and
patenting, creating inefficiencies. 1 0 6 As with rival-in-use problems,
upstream patenting and exclusive licensing of those patents can al-
leviate patent races by limiting the number of downstream contend-
ers. 1 0 7
Of course, as instantiations of commercialization theory and
Kitch's prospect theory, relying on upstream patenting to alleviate
rival-in-use problems and patent races or to redress lack of down-
stream appropriability, raises all the usual criticisms. The forward
protections of upstream patents are seldom coextensive with their
downstream applications and may expire too early or issue too late
to be helpful.108 Universities may not be well positioned to decide
which downstream applications to license or to which firm to grant
an exclusive license, and licensing itself creates a drag on commer-
cialization. But where rival-in-use, patent race, and unappropria-
bility problems pose greater obstacles to commercialization than do
transaction costs, the benefits of coordination through upstream pa-
tents may outweigh the costs. Moreover, patent races and rival-in-
use problems, although rare, may be more common in science-based
industries such as those based on federally funded university re-
search, where upstream breakthroughs often suggest particular
downstream applications and attract multiple firms interested in
103. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1047-48.
104. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1047; Scotchmer, supra note 48, at 819. But
see text accompanying notes 315-325, infra (discussing why downstream developers are far
more likely to underinvest in commercializing university research).
105. Duffy, supra note 8 passim; Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 90, at 68-69; Merges &
Nelson, supra note 58, at 908. Some scholars, however, believe that patent races are not that
common. E.g., Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1047.
106. McFetridge & Smith, supra note 30, at 202; Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 871.
107. Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 871; Scotchmer, supra note 48, at 838-39.
108. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 740.
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those prospects. 109 Patent races based on university research may
be particularly common in pharmaceuticals, where university re-
search often triggers private industry R&D.110
Ultimately, the utility of upstream patenting depends not only on
pre-invention costs but also on a number of post-invention condi-
tions, including the cost of commercializing the patented invention
and the appropriability of returns on those investments.' Where
commercialization investments are not protected by some type of
exclusivity, upstream patenting may be important, particularly
where developing downstream applications is complex, uncertain,
and costly. 112
Despite the large increase in university patenting, evidence of a
concomitant increase in actual tech transfer is sparse. How much
of the growth in university patenting stems from Bayh-Dole and
how much stems from expansion in government research spending
is unclear. For example, much of the increase in university-based
biomedical research patenting occurred simultaneously with an in-
crease in government funding for such research. 113 Empirical evi-
dence on the efficacy of patenting government-funded research is
equivocal at best, with conflicting studies showing only modest ef-
fects, if any. 114
C. Bayh-Dole and the Academic Ethos
The efficacy of university patenting under the Bayh-Dole Act
aside, many critics worry about Bayh-Dole's potential effect on uni-
versity research incentives and the social norms and culture of ac-
ademic research. 115 Universities are generally regarded as bastions
109. Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1047-48.
110. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 99, at 117.
111. Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1584-87; Kieff, supra note 26, at 747; Merges &
Nelson, supra note 58, at 843.
112. See Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 1070; Kieff, supra note 26; Mazzoleni & Nelson,
supra note 36, at 1047-48.
113. David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Academic Patents and Materials Transfer
Agreements: Substitutes or Complements?, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 157, 158 (2007). But see
Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1702-05 (questioning whether pre-Bayh-Dole government pa-
tents were actually underutilized).
114. Love, supra note 17, at 324-26; Charles R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of
the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and Development, in PERSPECTIVES ON
COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 435, 461-84 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2011).
115. E.g., Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 32; Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Re-
search and University Technology Transfer, in 16 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 93 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005).
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of learning and academic pursuit, not as for-profit institutions.1 1 6
Encouraging universities to view research projects in terms of their
patent value could derogate from the societal role of universities as
creating and curating an intellectual commons for the good of soci-
ety. 117 This ideal is embodied in the Mertonian norms of commu-
nalism, disinterestedness, and universalism-that is to say, free
sharing of research results, objectivity in generating those results,
and objectivity in evaluating others' results.1 18 Commentators fear
that the Bayh-Dole Act has diverted university researchers from
these norms, altering their choices in research topics and leading to
less sharing among researchers. Both historical and modern-day
evidence, however, suggests that Bayh-Dole has not significantly
affected the nature of university research.
Critics quite understandably fear that Bayh-Dole's focus on pa-
tenting may distort university research away from research for re-
search's sake in favor of more commercially oriented research. 119
Again, universities are popularly viewed as entities whose position
as government-funded institutions outside of market forces allows
them to pursue knowledge for the sake of knowledge, not for the
pursuit of profit or even practical application. This knowledge may
incidentally have practical value as a matter of serendipity, 120 but
presumably its greater value is in filling the void left by purely
profit-driven research.
At this point in time, however, no evidence suggests that univer-
sity researchers have altered their choice of research topics. 12 1 De-
spite Bayh-Dole, academic research choices continue to be driven
more by researcher interests than by commercial value. 122 Many
university faculty members are reluctant even to consider the pa-
tent or commercial value of their research. 123 To the extent that
116. See, e.g., DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION
OF HIGHER EDUCATION 18 (2003).
117. Nicholas S. Argyres & Julia Porter Liebeskind, Privatizing the Intellectual Commons:
Universities and the Commercialization of Biotechnology, 35 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 427,
431 (1998) (referring to ROBERT C. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1973)); Eisenberg,
supra note 16, at 182 (same).
118. See, e.g., Argyres & Liebeskind, supra note 117, at 441; Bagley, supra note 17, at 227-
28; Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 182-84. The fourth Mertonian norm, organized skepticism,
refers to the reproducibility of others' research. Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 184.
119. See, e.g., NRC, supra note 102, at 35 (and sources cited therein) (noting this concern).
120. Nelson, supra note 43, at 456, 461 (describing the ideal of a "Republic of Science")
(citing Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science, 1 MINERVA 54 (1962)).
121. NRC, supra note 102, at 35; Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Li-
censing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 SCI. 1052, 1052 (2003).
122. Frischmann, supra note 31, at 175.
123. Argyres & Liebeskind, supra note 117, at 447-48; Donald S. Siegel & Phillip H. Phan,
Analyzing the Effectiveness of University Technology Transfer: Implications for Entrepreneur-
ship Education, 13 (Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., Working Paper in Econ. No. 0426, 2004),
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university patenting has increased, the evidence suggests that fac-
ulty are simply patenting more of their research but not actually
changing the type of research they conduct. 1 2 4 And not surprisingly,
university patenting occurs in only a few areas of research, namely
biotechnology and medicine, agriculture, and electronics. 12 5
To say that university research topics remain non-commercial is
not to say that topics are chosen without regard to potential practi-
cal application, however. Unlike their counterparts in other indus-
trialized nations, the decentralized and heterogeneous universities
in the U.S. have long had a relationship with local industry, both as
a means of establishing prestige and as a means of attracting polit-
ical and financial support. 12 6 In fact, the relationships between ac-
ademia and private industry launched entirely new areas of tech-
nology long before Bayh-Dole. 127 A common oversimplification of
the relationship between the two is that technology develops in a
linear fashion from basic scientific research to practical industrial
application. 12 8 The relationship between basic and applied research
is more complex, however, such that the two often feed one another
and coevolve. 12 9 Furthermore, in order to compete for limited gov-
ernment research funding, academic researchers must often
demonstrate the practical potential of their research proposals.
Federal funding of university research has long been predicated on
the expectation of some practical benefit, particularly in defense,
energy, and health, 130 and government funding generally has be-
come increasingly application-oriented as the public demands
greater practical returns on its tax dollars. 13 1 Much university re-
http://www.economics.rpi.edulworkingpapers/rpi0426.pdf; Interview with Marie Kerbeshian,
Vice President of Tech. Commercialization, Ind. Univ. Res. & Tech. Corp., in Indianapolis,
Ind. (Mar. 5, 2015).
124. NRC, supra note 102, at 3, 35; Thursby & Thursby, supra note 121, at 1052.
125. MOWERY ETAL., supra note 11, at 2-3; Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1047;
Mowery, supra note 46, at 16.
126. Mireles, supra note 27, at 265; Mowery & Sampat, supra note 99, at 118.
127. MOWERY ETAL., supra note 11, at 15.
128. Nelson, supra note 43, at 457-59. Carl Shapiro has described this linear model as
the "move from pure R to applied R and ultimately to D" in R&D. Carl Shapiro, Navigating
the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION
POLICYAND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
129. MOWERY ETAL., supra note 11, at 94-95; Nelson, supra note 43, at 457-59.
130. MOWERY ETAL., supra note 11, at 24-26; Greenbaum, supra note 17, at 336-37.
131. Cohen et al., supra note 35, at 2; Interview with Marie Kerbeshian, supra note 123.
Indeed, it is because of its practical orientation that university research is patentable at all.
Robert A. Lowe et al., What Happens in University-Industry Technology Transfer?: Evidence
from Five Case Studies, in IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-
INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 152, 185 (David
C. Mowery et al. eds., 2004).
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search can therefore be described as falling within "Pasteur's Quad-
rant": research that is valuable both as groundwork for later down-
stream technologies and as knowledge per se. 13 2
Regardless of whether patenting university research under
Bayh-Dole leads to a more commercially oriented selection of re-
search topics, some point out that fear of patent infringement lia-
bility may hamper other academics in studying areas closely related
to the patented subject matter. 133 So far, fear of infringement does
not seem to pose much of a problem. 134 Researchers, especially ac-
ademics, often just ignore patents in conducting their own research
on the belief that an experimental-use exemption exempts them
from liability. 135 The Federal Circuit has effectively held that no
such experimental-use exception applies to university research, 136
but patent infringement by university researchers is often not
worth policing, and patent holders have been reluctant thus far to
sue academic infringers; some firms even encourage such infringe-
ment, as it provides them with further knowledge about their pa-
tented technologies. 13 7 That being said, universities are increas-
132. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 11, at 24-26; Nelson, supra note 43, at 456-57 (referring
to practically oriented research within "Pasteur's Quadrant") (citing DONALD E. STOKES,
PASTEUR'S QUADRANT: BASIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (1997)).
133. E.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004); Strandburg, supra note 115.
134. See Adelman, supra note 18, at 133; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonen-
forcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L.
REV. 1059, 1080 (2008).
135. A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 100, at 72; Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 324-25;
John P. Walsh et al., The View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCI. 2002
(2005); see also Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (noting that
industry researchers also often ignore patents).
136. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (no experimental-use ex-
emption applies where research is the "legitimate business" of the alleged infringer); see also
A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 100, at 73, 76-77.
137. See Adelman, supra note 18, at 142-43, 151; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at
700-01; Lemley, supra note 14, at 623; Mireles, supra note 27, at 275-76 (and sources cited
therein); Victor H. Polk, Jr. & Roman Fayerberg, When Patented Technologies Get Put to
Experimental Use: Practical Considerations for Nanotech R&D, 8 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 152,
153-54 (2011); Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 317, 326-27 (noting that many firms claim
reluctance to sue university researchers for patent infringement).
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ingly becoming the instigators and even targets of patent enforce-
ment threats, 138 especially as the perception of universities as com-
mercial actors continues to grow. 139
Furthermore, in science-based technologies such as biotechnol-
ogy and nanotechnology, R&D opportunities currently outnumber
capacity, and researchers have ample freedom to operate within
these fields. 140 Patents in these fields can often be avoided by pur-
suing alternative research avenues or by otherwise redirecting
R&D efforts to design around the patents. 141 For example, despite
a large volume of overall patenting in the broad field of biotechnol-
ogy, 1 4 2 the concentration of patenting in any one subfield of biotech-
nology remains small, posing few barriers to entry by others. 143
Nanotechnology likely offers a similarly wide range of research av-
enues, given the even larger number of subfields that fall under its
broad umbrella. 144 For example, carbon nanotubes are frequently
referred to as basic nanotechnology "building blocks," 1 45 but for
many applications organic and polymer nanotubes may provide
138. A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 100, at 73, 76-77; Christopher Brown, Ayresian Tech-
nology, Schumpeterian Innovation, and the Bayh-Dole Act, 43 J. ECON. ISSUES 477, 479
(2009); Lemley, supra note 14, at 622; see also Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair"*
Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research
Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (2001) (describing Roche's suit against universities and others
for alleged infringement of patents on the PCR patents).
139. Kesan, supra note 37, at 2183; Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1
passim (2013); Nelson, supra note 43, at 466. If the infringement occurs among public uni-
versities and research institutions, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Florida Prepaid
may provide sovereign immunity from suit. A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 100, at 78-79;
Eisenberg, supra note 134, at 1092.
140. See Adelman, supra note 28, at 1003-15 (noting that most diseases offer more poten-
tial research targets than there are available researchers); David E. Adelman & Kathryn L.
DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1677 passim (2007); Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 304-05.
141. A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 100, at 72; Eisenberg, supra note 134, at 1064; Eisen-
berg, supra note 66, at 22; Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 324.
142. Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 140, at 1687 (but noting a decline in biotech pa-
tents issued as utility standards and PTO resources tightened).
143. Id. at 1701-06 (noting that most subclasses of biotechnology contained fewer than
100 patents); Michael Lounsbury et al., The Politics of Neglect: Path Selection and Develop-
ment in Nanotechnology Innovation, in 21 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: SPANNING BOUNDARIES AND DISCIPLINES: UNIVERSITY
TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION IN THE IDEA AGE 27, 31-32 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2010)
(measuring ease of entry by patent saturation in subcategories of nanotechnology).
144. Because of its obvious potential for applications in a wide range of technologies, in-
cluding material science, telecommunications, energy, medicine, and textiles, research in
nanotechnology may also be unusually cross-disciplinary in effect. Lemley, supra note 14, at
614-15.
145. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 14, at 613-14; Graham Reynolds, Nanotechnology and
the Tragedy of the Anticommons: Towards a Strict Utility Requirement, 6 U. OTTAWA L. &
TECH. J. 79, 86 (2009).
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technologically meaningful alternatives. 14 6 And although all three
types of nanotubes are protected under a variety of patents, down-
stream developers do at least have a wider range of competitive op-
tions, which may help to mitigate the risk of an anticommons. 1 4 7 A
separate question, of course, is whether the available alternatives
serve as well as the patented technologies, or whether they are only
inferior substitutes that force others to invest in finding alterna-
tives, 1 4 8-although this question is true of all patents, regardless of
their number or whether they cover upstream research.
Critics also voice concerns that the emphasis on patenting under
the Bayh-Dole Act may discourage publication, collaboration, and
other forms of information sharing. 149 Universities traditionally
placed their research into the public domain through publication
and other means under the so-called Mertonian ethic communalism
in scientific research.1 5 0 Tech transfer between universities and be-
tween universities and private industry has long been thought to
occur most effectively through these mechanisms. 15 1 Indeed, one of
the virtues of funding university research through tax dollars prior
to the Bayh-Dole Act was that it freed universities from the need
to privatize and propertize their research in order to recoup costs. 1 52
Empirical studies have in fact suggested that faculty researchers
who patent more tend to collaborate less with other researchers. 153
Studies also show that a significant number of agreements between
private industry and universities require that the academic side de-
146. Lounsbury et al., supra note 143, at 48-50. The authors point out, however, that
other political, financial, and cultural factors may influence which paths R&D eventually
takes. Id.
147. But see DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 152 (2009) (noting that even upstream research can face anticommons and
patent thickets where research efforts are clustered on the same few topics).
148. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 700; Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 219 n.217;
Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, Research Tool Patents After Integra v. Merck--Have
They Reached a Safe Harbor?, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 388 (2008).
149. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 16; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 32; Love, supra
note 17, at 322-23; Rai, supra note 3; Strandburg, supra note 115. But see Cohen et al., supra
note 37, at 179 (noting greater collaboration between universities and private industry post-
Bayh-Dole).
150. Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at 463-64; Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and
Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 671 (2004) (citing ROBERT K. MERTON,
THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 270-78 (Norman
W. Storer ed., 1973)).
151. Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at 464.
152. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1667.
153. See, e.g., Tania Bubela et al., Commercialization and Collaboration: Competing Poli-
cies in Publicly Funded Stem Cell Research?, 7 CELL STEM CELL 25 (2010) (studying Cana-
dian researchers); Matthew Herder, Choice Patents, 52 IDEA 309 (2012) (studying cancer
researchers in the U.S.).
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lay publishing until, or in some cases even after, a patent applica-
tion has been filed. 1 5 4 But others note that, long before the Bayh-
Dole Act and long before patenting university research took hold,
academic reality often violated the Mertonian ideal of communal-
ism, with competition for grant money, tenure standards, and the
desire to establish one's reputation often leading to withholding of
data and materials and refusals to collaborate. 15 5 Nonetheless, the
patents themselves do disclose information, 15 6 and universities
have begun to push back against requests to delay publishing.1 5 7
University researchers also continue to transfer knowledge through
collaboration, student placement, consultation, and other means, as
discussed in further detail below.
III. UNIVERSITY PATENTING UNDER BAYH-DOLE AS
BURDENSOME
So far, this article discussed only the potential benefits of univer-
sity patenting under the Bayh-Dole Act, but as many have recog-
nized, the Act may incur a number of potential costs as well. Critics
of the Bayh-Dole Act express concern that, far from facilitating
downstream development, patents on federally funded research will
in fact hinder such development. For example, Professors Rebecca
Eisenberg, Michael Heller, Mark Lemley, and a number of others
have suggested that patents on upstream university research have
the potential to obstruct "downstream" development of applications
of that research. These critics argue that, by adding unnecessarily
to the number of patents that must be licensed, Bayh-Dole also
added to the cost and difficulty of downstream development.15 8
Moreover, the Act also introduced universities as a new class of pa-
tent holders that lack both the expertise and inclination to license
154. Blumenthal et al., supra note 37, at 371; Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding
in Academic Genetics: Evidence from a National Survey, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 473, 478
(2002).
155. Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific
Research, 13 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 145, 146 (1996); Nelson, supra note 43, at 463.
156. NRC, supra note 102, at 31.
157. Id. at 33-34; see also Fiona E. Murray et al., How Does the Republic of Science Shape
the Patent System? Broadening the Institutional Analysis of Innovation Beyond Patents, 1
U.C. IRVINE L. REV., 357, 373 (2011) ("[A] firm cannot easily compel scientists to secrecy (ex-
cept under narrow conditions of trade secrecy) anymore than scientists can assert their rights
to free publication if this would eviscerate any commercial return."). But see MOWERY ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 7 (expressing concern that Bayh-Dole will eventually have negative effects
on university choice of research topics, disclosure of results, conflicts of interest, and so on).
158. See generally, Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14; Lemley, supra note 14.
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their patents effectively. 159 The combined effect of all of these
changes in patenting patterns is to inflate overall transaction costs
and hinder downstream development. By patenting government-
funded, basic research, Bayh-Dole leads to overly fragmented
rights and the "tragedy of the anticommons."1 6 0 Professors Heller
and Eisenberg cite biotechnology, genetics in particular, as a possi-
ble example of an anticommons at work, 161 and Professor Lemley
cites nanotechnology development as another possible example. 162
No evidence so far, however, supports the contention that Bayh-
Dole creates anticommons in these fields or any other, although pa-
tents on truly foundational patents under Bayh-Dole may pose sig-
nificant obstacles to downstream development.
A. Does University Patenting Lead to Anticommons and Other
Hold-Up Problems?
At their core, property rights are the right to exclude others from
using a particular resource. 163 Others who want to use the resource
for any reason must first obtain permission, often in exchange for
some type of consideration; this may create inefficiencies, particu-
larly if the proposed use is socially beneficial. The mere fact of frag-
mented rights means that returns on any subsequent development
must now be split among a larger number of rights holders, decreas-
ing the return per holder and thereby decreasing the incentive any
given rights holder has to invest in development at all. And the
larger the number of property rights involved, the greater the diffi-
culty, the greater the potential inefficiencies, and the greater the
risk of an "anticommons," or property rights that are so fragmented
that underuse is a certainty. 164 Because patents also give the right
to exclude others from making or using the covered inventions, pa-
tents can likewise create a drag on downstream development of
159. Celestine Chukumba & Richard Jensen, University Invention, Entrepreneurship, and
Start-Ups, 13, 18-19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11475, 2005),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11475; Interview with Marie Kerbeshian, supra note 123.
160. See Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 640; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698.
161. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14.
162. See generally Lemley, supra note 14; see also Raj Bawa, Nanotechnology Patent Pro-
liferation and the Crisis at the U.S. Patent Office, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 699 (2007).
163. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54
DUKE L.J. 1, 52-58 (2004). These rights are not absolute, of course, and are subject to a
number of limitations. Id.
164. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Heller & Eisenberg, supra
note 14, at 698.
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commercializable applications or even for research. 165 Simply the
fact that a given application might be subject to one or more up-
stream patents would tend to reduce incentives to create the down-
stream application because the upstream patent holders will ex-
tract a share of the returns, leaving less for the downstream inven-
tor.16 6
And just as over-fragmentation of property rights creates an an-
ticommons, over-fragmentation of patent rights to a given technol-
ogy can cause underuse and under-development. 167 For example, a
single product may depend on the combination of separately pa-
tented but complementary components; the product will not be
made if the individual patent rights cannot be coordinated. 168 In
other cases a patent may cover a downstream development. In cu-
mulative technologies, upstream patents, such as university re-
search patents, and downstream development or improvements pa-
tent rights must be vertically coordinated in order to make or use a
product or process. 169 Patent floods are also common in university-
based technologies, as scientific breakthroughs lead to sudden in-
creases in patent applications. 170 Patent floods in turn can lead to
patent thickets, in which patent rights become particularly dense
and overlapping, because of either broad patent scope or floods of
simultaneously filed but overlapping applications that strain the
PTO's resources. 17 1 Patent thickets also arise when many comple-
mentary patents are needed to produce a single good.172 Semicon-
ductors, biotechnology, and computer software are examples of
fields in which patent thickets are thought to be most prevalent. 173
165. Specifically, the Patent Act grants a patent holder the right to exclude others from
making, using, selling, or offering to sell the subject invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154.
166. Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 309, 323 (2002).
167. Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing
Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 166-67 (2011).
168. Michael Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 103, 113 (2012).
These types of complementary technologies are sometimes referred to as Cournot compli-
ments. Id. at 113-14 (discussing AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE
MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 103-04 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans.,
Augustus. M. Kelley ed., 2d ed. 1838)).
169. Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1612-13; Nelson, supra note 43, at 464; Shapiro,
supra note 128, at 123.
170. Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 907-08.
171. Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1627; Meurer, supra note 166, at 324-25; Shapiro,
supra note 128, at 120.




Similarly, many commentators are concerned that university pa-
tenting in nanotechnology is not just prolific but also "broad, over-
lapping, and fragmented" in ownership. 17 4
All the same, in a Coasean world of zero transaction costs, even
highly balkanized patent rights could be easily assembled when
beneficial. In the real world, however, valuation difficulties, con-
flicting interests, and rent-seeking can frustrate agreement among
multiple owners to use their patent rights jointly.1 7 5 In fact, the
costs of simply having to transact with patent rights or resource
holders further reduce the returns on downstream development in-
vestments. Thus, underutilization can occur when the increased
transaction costs of fragmented patent rights create obstacles to
further innovation and use.17 6
One particular twist that Bayh-Dole adds to the mix, moreover,
is the concomitant growth in universities as patentees; university
patenting has increased by about sixteen fold since Bayh-Dole was
enacted.1 7 7 Because universities do not and cannot commercialize
their own research, universities must now incur the costs of identi-
fying and transacting with private firms to develop the patented
technology into usable end products. 178 More significantly, univer-
sities are not only unwanted market actors, but also institutions
with interests in and internal structures very different from any
other market actor. The unique position of universities as patent
licensors under Bayh-Dole thus further exacerbates transaction
costs: not only do patents now exist where they had not before, but
also private industry must now transact with universities more of-
ten than they had before. 1 7 9
As a first matter, almost thirty-five years after Bayh-Dole was
enacted, universities are still quite new to the world of commercial-
izing intellectual property and lack the experience and expertise for
patent licensing. 18 0 Indeed, universities are still reluctant to view
themselves as commercial entities,1 81 and university Technology
174. Reynolds, supra note 145, at 83 (citing Press Release, Lux Research, Inc., Nanotech-
nology Gold Rush Yields Crowded, Entangled Patents (Apr. 21, 2005), http://www.prnews-
wire.com/news-releases/nanotechnology-gold-rush-yields-crowded-entangled-patents-
54373177.html).
175. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698.
176. Mossoff, supra note 167, at 166-67.
177. Lemley, supra note 14, at 617; Frank Murray et al., Defense Drivers for Nanotechnol-
ogy Commercialization: Technology, Case Studies, and Legal Issues, 9 NANOTECH. L. & Bus.
4, 31 (2012).
178. Lemley, supra note 14, at 626.
179. See, e.g., Blumenthal et al., supra note 37, at 370.
180. MOWERY ETAL., supra note 11, at 88-91; Chukumba & Jensen, supra note 159, at 13,
18-19; Interview with Marie Kerbeshian, supra note 123.
181. Osenga, supra note 29, at 421.
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Transfer Offices ("TTOs") simply do not have the market-based ori-
entation that private commercial entities do. 182 Second, universi-
ties have very different internal authority structures from commer-
cial firms, and even the different constituencies within a university
often have agendas that differ from one another, further complicat-
ing matters. 183 Third, and most important, universities have very
different interests and incentives than do private firms, leading to
difficulty agreeing. For example, universities may overestimate the
relative value of their contributions to downstream development, as
the academic mindset typically prizes research over applications
and ideas over products. 184 Universities may also demand re-
strictions on publication rights, restrictions on licensing or transfer
of protected technologies or materials to other institutions, or
reach-through licenses to downstream products, allowing them to
extract an even greater share of any returns and leaving less for the
downstream inventor.185 Horizontally positioned entities with sim-
ilar values and interests, by contrast, will find it easier to come to
agreement, particularly if they are repeat players.186 This last fac-
tor is what I have previously termed a "qualitative," as opposed to
a "quantitative" anticommons, in which, regardless of the number
of rights holders, the heterogeneity of transacting parties and the
divergence of their respective interests and incentives can compli-
cate agreement transaction costs.18 7
Finally, because so much of university research is research-ori-
ented rather than application-oriented and therefore quite basic,
the overall effect of Bayh-Dole is to allow modern-day researchers
to patent "incomplete" inventions that have no immediate utility
other than as subjects for further development by others.188 As a
182. See generally Argyres & Liebeskind, supra note 117; Fini & Lacetera, supra note 40
passim.
183. See Argyres & Liebeskind, supra note 117, at 446; Jensen & Thursby, supra note 36,
at 244; Interview with Marie Kerbeshian, supra note 123; see also Blumenthal et al., supra
note 37, at 370 (reporting university bureaucracy and regulations as the most frequent ob-
stacle to life science companies forming research relationships with universities).
184. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 701.
185. A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 100, at 71; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 699;
Osenga, supra note 29, at 427.
186. JOHN C. MILLER ET AL., THE HANDBOOK OF NANOTECHNOLOGY: BUSINESS, POLICY,
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 76 (2005); Jensen & Thursby, supra note 36, at 244; see
also Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 700 (noting heterogeneity of interests increases
transaction costs); Smith, supra note 74, at 1776 (same).
187. Mark D. West & Emily Michiko Morris, The Tragedy of the Condominiums: Legal
Responses to Collective Action Problems After the Kobe Earthquake, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 903,
928 n.69 (2003).
188. Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 884; Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innova-
tion in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 813, 839-40 (2001).
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result, university inventions require significant additional invest-
ment before they yield usable products of any value, but universi-
ties can still demand licensing or royalty fees for their upstream
patents, effectively allowing universities to extract rents from
downstream developers. And because university technologies are
typically more conceptual and less concrete, the boundaries of their
patent rights may also be more vague and abstract, creating patent
rights that are not only broader in scope but also more suspect in
validity.189 The resulting poor quality patents further aggravate
transaction costs because of the difficulties of valuing the patent
and agreeing on whether it needs to be licensed, 190 and licensing
what turns out to be an invalid patent creates unnecessary drag on
downstream development. 19 1 These three elements-a high volume
of patents, early-stage inventions, and university patent owner-
ship-all may contribute to underutilization of university research.
If exploitation and commercialization of government-funded uni-
versity research is the goal, releasing research into the public do-
main, rather than patenting it, is often more efficient. 192 Public-
domain status permits access to all downstream firms interested in
creating social value from the research and simultaneously fosters
competition among the firms. Given that inventive concepts are
nonrivalrous, there is no reason not to allow as many entities as
possible to try their hands at creating downstream applications,
and for many technologies competition is more effective than mo-
nopoly in spurring efficient development. 193 If Eisenberg, Heller,
Lemley and other critics are correct, why not favor a competitive
environment in the case of government-funded research, particu-
larly where incentives to invent would be unaffected? 194
For the most part, the vast majority of university research is
freely available to all competitors. Again, university patenting is
largely limited to a few select fields and is important to only a few
industries-biotechnology and medicine, agriculture, and electron-
ics. 1 9 5 In those fields where patenting does occur, only a small
amount of government-funded research has been patented since
189. Rai, supra note 188, at 839-40 (vague patent boundaries broader in preemptive
scope); Reynolds, supra note 145, at 99 (vague patents more likely to be invalid).
190. Reynolds, supra note 145, at 99.
191. Shapiro, supra note 128, at 125.
192. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1702, 1710-11.
193. Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1604-08 (and sources cited therein); Merges &
Nelson, supra note 58, at 843-44.
194. Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 843-44.
195. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 11, at 2-3; Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 36, at 1047;
Mowery, supra note 46, at 16.
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Bayh-Dole was enacted, and an even smaller percentage has been
licensed, 196 presumably because extremely little of this research has
been of commercial interest1 97 and because research choices con-
tinue to be driven more by academic interest than by commercial
value. 198 In addition, TTOs often face resistance from their own
faculty researchers, who would rather their research be freely avail-
able to others through the public domain. 199 Even university ad-
ministrators can often be reluctant to invest in patenting faculty
research, as university resources are limited and the returns from
patents on upstream research are too uncertain to warrant the
costs. 2 0 0 Patents may yield additional reputational benefits as ob-
jective measures of productivity for both the university and its in-
dividual researchers, 201 but for the most part it is prohibitively ex-
pensive to patent university research when publication and other
signals may serve just as well. 20 2 University TTO managers report
that universities will not assume the high costs of filing and prose-
cuting patents when industry has expressed little or no interest in
the technology, 203 and will only do so when required by their private
sponsors or when a licensee for the patented technology has already
been identified.204 In addition, because university research often
focuses not on inventing new technologies but on understanding
naturally occurring phenomena and on advancing theories to ex-
plain those phenomena, much if not most of that research is too
"basic" to be patentable; even if technologically valuable, discover-
ies and theories about natural laws and phenomena are unpatent-
able subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act. 2 0 5 And again,
even when the results are patentable, faculty often prefer that their
196. Love, supra note 17, at 303-04; Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 309.
197. Frischmann, supra note 31, at 175; Love, supra note 17, at 308-12; Osenga, supra
note 29, at 421.
198. NRC, supra note 102, at 35.
199. Interview with Marie Kerbeshian, supra note 123.
200. Osenga, supra note 29, at 421.
201. Lee, supra note 150, at 676; Love, supra note 17, at 332-34.
202. Adelman, supra note 18, at pt. III; Kesan, supra note 37, at 2184; see also A PATENT
SYSTEM, supra note 100, at 38 (noting that each patent prosecution cost between $10,000 and
$30,000 in 2004 and the figure was rising).
203. BNA, supra note 22, at 225, 227-32; Adelman, supra note 18, at pt. III; McManis &
Noh, supra note 114, at 454; Siegel & Phan, supra note 123, at 7.
204. Jensen & Thursby, supra note 36, at 244.
205. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (explaining scope of Patent Act); see also Peter Lee, The Evolution
of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, pt. I.B.3 (2008); Mark Williamson &
James Carpenter, Traversing Art Rejections in Nanotechnology Patent Applications -- No
Small Task, 7 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 131, 137-38 & n.40 (2010) (and cases cited therein).
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research remain in the public domain, 206 fostering free competition
among interested downstream developers.
Nonetheless, university patenting has clearly risen in volume
since the Bayh-Dole Act, and this could have a profound impact on
downstream development, particularly if the fact of patenting cor-
relates with potential commercial value. Again, patents stifle
downstream development where innovation is cumulative or com-
plementary, such as in the fields of semiconductors, electronics,
computers, and computer software, where new inventions build on
existing technologies and where new inventions are only one part
of a larger invention.207 Although patents in these fields are hardly
unique to universities, to the extent that university patents have
increased the overall level of patenting, Bayh-Dole may have exac-
erbated the costs of horizontal or vertical coordination of patent
rights. 208 Similarly, in technologies such as computer software,
semiconductors, and genetics, where unpatented alternative devel-
opment avenues or complements are less plentiful and where uni-
versity research is less basic and more incremental, university pa-
tents are not unique but all the same can aggravate patent thickets
and further deter downstream development. 209
And even in the science-based technologies, where the field is less
crowded and major advances over prior art are possible,210 univer-
sity patents may still pose hold-up problems, given that university
research is a dominant influence in these fields. In particular, a
few critical upstream technologies may be fundamental enough
that patent exclusivity over them could significantly stifle down-
stream development. 211 All upstream technologies by definition
serve primarily as bases for downstream research and develop-
ment, but a few upstream inventions are so key that they serve as
foundations for entire fields of technology; without these founda-
tional inventions, further progress in their respective fields would
be difficult or impossible. 212 Commonly cited as examples of foun-
dational inventions are research tools such as Cohen and Boyer's
206. Argyres & Liebeskind, supra note 117, at 447-48; Siegel & Phan, supra note 123, at
13; Interview with Marie Kerbeshian, supra note 123.
207. Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 881; Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Pa-
tents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Inno-
vation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 168 (2004).
208. Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1612-13; Nelson, supra note 43, at 464; Shapiro,
supra note 128, at 123.
209. Shapiro, supra note 128, at 121-22.
210. Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 884.
211. Nelson, supra note 43, at 464; Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 305-06.
212. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Manage-
ment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 928 (2005); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers,
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patented process for creating recombinant DNA and Cetus's pa-
tented polymerase chain reaction ("PCR") process for reproducing
DNA, both of which are considered bedrock technologies that made
possible the modern fields of genetics and molecular biology. 213
While patent protection was arguably more warranted for Cetus's
privately developed PCR process than for the Cohen-Boyer recom-
binant DNA process, which was invented at Stanford University
through government grants, the patents on both processes effec-
tively allowed the upstream patent holders to extract rents from
their downstream licensees. 214 While the example of Cetus's pri-
vately developed PCR process demonstrates that foundational in-
ventions are not unique to universities, 2 15 university researchers
are more likely to hit upon foundational inventions, particularly in
the science-based technologies, just by virtue of the nature of their
research. 216 Even then, very little of university research is truly
foundational in the sense of having a broad base application to its
technology as a whole, 217 but patents on the few inventions that are
foundational, although technically not an anticommons problem, do
have the potential to obstruct both upstream and downstream
R&D. 218
107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 294 (2007); Lee, supra note 205, at 89-91. Foundational inventions
are also known as "common-method research tools," Adelman, supra note 18, at 139, or "plat-
form technologies," McManis & Noh, supra note 114, at 485.
213. Lee, supra note 205, at 93-94; Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 305-06. Harvard's
onco-mouse, human embryonic stem cell lines, interoperability standards in information
technology, and probe microscopy have also been cited as examples of foundational technol-
ogies. Lee, supra note 205, at 94-96; Morris, supra note 15, at _; Mowery, supra note 46, at
55-57; Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 305-09.
214. Mowery, supra note 46, at 55 & n.20; see also Lemley, supra note 14, at 611 & n.47
(noting that, although the Cohen-Boyer patents did not bar access to downstream develop-
ers, they did raise the cost of R&D in molecular biology, and noting that Cetus's patents were
held unenforceable many years later). Although time and technological progress often pro-
vide new alternatives that make earlier foundational technologies obsolete, Kieff, supra note
26, at 730-31; Lee, supra note 205, at 86-91 (noting that what constitutes a foundational
invention changes as its technological field evolves), the delays and costs of waiting for alter-
natives to emerge contribute to the problems posed by foundational patents.
215. For example, the foundational research for gallium-nitride, used in broad-spectrum
semi-conductors, is unusual in that private industry, rather than universities, was responsi-
ble for most of the foundational research for the invention. Lowe et al., supra note 131, at
161.
216. For example, the onco-mouse, human embryonic stem cells, and the CD34 stem-cell
antigen are all foundational patents stemming from university research. Walsh et al., supra
note 100, at 305-09.
217. A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 100, at 72; Adelman, supra note 28, at 1020; Adelman,
supra note 18, at 139; McManis & Noh, supra note 114, at 486.
218. Adelman, supra note 18, at 139; McManis & Noh, supra note 114, at 486-87; Walsh
et al., supra note 100, at 305.
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Nevertheless, the mere fact of university patenting is not itself
sufficient to cause either qualitative or quantitative hold-up prob-
lems. As a first matter, university patents do not appear to be any
lower in quality than patents from other sources. Although the
overall quality of university-sought patents did briefly decline after
passage of Bayh-Dole, that decline appears to have been restricted
to TTOs that were new to patenting post-Bayh-Dole and amelio-
rated over time.219 TTOs that had established patent practices pre-
Bayh-Dole, by contrast, continued to file and receive patents equiv-
alent in quality to non-academic patents within the same classes. 220
Second, despite the increase in university patents, the number of
patents on average that need to be licensed for any given down-
stream development project remains small.2 2 1
Perhaps more significant is the fact that heterogeneity of inter-
ests, such as those that exist between non-profit universities and
profit-driven private industry, can actually mitigate rather than
cause hold-up problems. 222 For example, firms can be reluctant to
license upstream patents from competitors for fear of revealing in-
formation about their own development plans,223 but universities
are not market competitors and present no such risks. Similarly,
universities may license their patents more freely because they are
not constrained with concerns about cannibalizing their own prod-
ucts. 2 2 4 Further, of the few university inventions that are founda-
tional, evidence suggests that many patents, like the Cohen-Boyer
recombinant DNA patents, are licensed liberally and non-exclu-
sively, 225 and in the case of the Cohen-Boyer process, licensed on a
sliding scale for relatively low fees. 2 2 6 And while some universities,
such as Harvard, MIT, and the University of Wisconsin, have gar-
nered significant revenues from patent licensing and enforcement
219. MOWERY ETAL., supra note 11, at 129-48.
220. Specifically, studies show that, as TTOs gain experience, their patents are of similar
"importance" (as defined by number of forward citations) and "generality" (as defined by
number of forward citations outside of the patent's class) as non-academic patents within the
same classes. David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Academic Patent Quality and Quantity
Before and After the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States, 31 RES. POL'Y 399 (2002); Bhaven
N. Sampat et al., Changes in University Patent Quality After the Bayh-Dole Act: A Re-exam-
ination, 21 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 1371, 1379 (2003).
221. Eisenberg, supra note 134, at 1078-79; Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 294.
222. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 700.
223. Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 22.
224. Rai, supra note 188, at 830-31. Some argue, however, that universities should take
a more business-oriented approach in order to avoid creating qualitative anticommons. See,
e.g., Osenga, supra note 29.
225. Adelman, supra note 18, at pt. III; Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 323.
226. Lee, supra note 205, at 93-94; Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 305-06.
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in a few notable cases, 2 2 7 the vast majority of faculty even at those
high-profile schools show little interest in trying to profit from their
research. 228 To be sure, lack of faculty interest in the commercial
value of their research may actually hamper tech transfer,229 just
as university or government agency policies to license patents as
broadly as possible may frustrate private licensees who would pre-
fer exclusivity.230 Although these are instances in which heteroge-
neity of interests do have a negative impact on licensing, it is im-
portant to note that these problems occurred even before Bayh-
Dole was enacted, and are not due to patent exclusivity (and indeed,
as the discussion in Part I suggests, patent exclusivity may attract
private investments in commercialization). 231
Regardless of how foundational a patent might or might not be,
the fact remains that patents can and often do create additional
costs that, at the margin, may deter or delay later downstream de-
velopment. 232 Even modest or royalty-free licenses are counterpro-
ductive, especially when cumulative. 233 Unless we can demonstrate
that university patenting under Bayh-Dole actually facilitates com-
mercialization, perhaps we should err on the side of releasing all
university research into the public domain to allow free competition
in using and developing that research. Again, the empirical evi-
dence thus far is equivocal at best as to whether the increase in
university patenting has actually impeded downstream develop-
ment, however, 234 largely because of the difficulties of testing such
a hypothesis. 235
B. Proposed Solutions to Bayh-Dole Hold-Up Problems
Given that we have no reliable evidence at this time that Bayh-
Dole has caused hold-up problems, the many proposals for "fixing"
Bayh-Dole may be somewhat premature or, as one scholar phrased
227. See Mowery, supra note 46, at 52-54; Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 306-09.
228. Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Pros and Cons of Faculty Participation in
Licensing, in 16 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 187, 200
(Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005).
229. See id. at 193-95 (arguing that faculty interest and involvement is critical for com-
mercialization of university research).
230. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 700.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 80-94.
232. Frischmann, supra note 212, at 996-97; Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 304 (sug-
gesting that royalty stacking of biomedical patents makes a difference only at the margins).
233. Shapiro, supra note 128, at 125.
234. Mireles, supra note 27, at 261, 274 (citing various empirical studies on the effect of
Bayh-Dole); Osenga, supra note 29, at 410; Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, supra
note 148, at 387-88 (summarizing empirical studies on effects of Bayh-Dole).
235. McManis & Noh, supra note 114, at 440, 475.
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it, "legislative solutions for what are, at best, potential problems in
the operation of the Act." 2 3 6 One category of proposals is to tighten
the patentability and patent eligibility standards, such as the util-
ity requirement and patentable subject matter restrictions, to make
it more difficult to patent much of the upstream research currently
being done under government funding.237 Yet other proposed solu-
tions focus on reducing transaction costs and limiting royalty stack-
ing by modifying liability for infringing patents subject to the Bayh-
Dole Act. These include compulsory licensing; 2 38 greater experi-
mental-use exemptionS 239 or even a fair-use exemption; 240 resurrec-
tion of the reverse doctrine of equivalents (and continued limitation
on the doctrine of equivalents); 241 more limited injunctive relief,2 42
particularly where the patent holder is a non-producing entity such
as a university; 243 more accurate apportionment of damages; 244 Jim-
itations on treble damages for willful infringement; 2 4 5 and govern-
ment management of upstream patents, 246 among other means.
Private ordering solutions may also help reduce transaction costs.
Although a more detailed discussion of these various proposals is
beyond the scope of this article, some of the drawbacks and costs for
a few of these proposals are included here.
For example, suggestions to tighten patentability standards over-
look that fact that these standards are already stricter, particularly
with regard to research or other "incomplete" patents. First, the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Association for Molecular Pa-
thology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 2 4 7 and Mayo Collaborative Services
236. Id. at 440.
237. Reynolds, supra note 145, at 101-12.
238. E.g., Terry K. Tullis, Comment: Application of the Government License Defense to
Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research: The Case for Limited Patent Compulsory Licens-
ing Regime, 53 UCLA L. REV. 279, 307-311 (2005).
239. E.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at 469; Mireles, supra note 27; Mueller, supra note
138.
240. E.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000).
241. Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1657-58; Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at 469.
242. Lee, supra note 205, at pt. IV; Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent
Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 155 (2007).
243. Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1665-68. But see Kieff, supra note 26, at 732-36
(criticizing proposals to use liability rather than property rules).
244. Lemley, supra note 242, at 165-66.
245. See, e.g., A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 100, at 108-09; Lemley, supra note 14, at 630;
Lemley, supra note 242, at 164-65; Strandburg, supra note 115, at 113; see also Mireles,
supra note 27, at 261 (discussing more robust research exemptions in the EU and Japan).
246. See generally Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 32.
247. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116-17 (2013) (even valuable discoveries of natural phenomena are
unpatentable subject matter if not "markedly different" from nature).
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v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. 2 4 8 have already tightened patent-
able subject matter restrictions, thereby increasing the likelihood
that "discoveries" of naturally occurring materials or principles will
be found unpatentable. 2 4 9 The courts and the PTO similarly had
already tightened the utility requirement, largely in reaction to the
flood of biotechnology research patent applications, by clarifying
that the specific and substantial utility standards required more
than recitations of general utilities common to the broad class of
technology to which a claimed invention belonged.250
Second, the patent system also already limits patentability to a
great extent by interpreting many patents in new technologies ra-
ther narrowly through the enablement requirement and-in partic-
ular-the written description requirement, 25 1 the latter of which
has most often been applied to narrow university-held biotechnol-
ogy patents. 2 5 2  On the other hand, simply narrowing patent
breadth through the disclosure requirements may do little to reduce
the transaction costs, as researchers may simply compensate by in-
creasing the number of patent applications, thereby potentially ex-
acerbating the anticommons effect. 253
More to the point, proposals to tighten patentability standards
oversimplify things a bit. Exactly how to adjust patentable subject
matter, utility, non-obviousness, or the other requirements to miti-
gate hold-up problems is hardly clear. 2 5 4 Even those who advocate
for tightening patentability requirements acknowledge that more
stringent requirements may be both under- and over-inclusive. 2 5 5
On the one hand, university-created technologies often serve dual
248. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012) (mere recitation of scientific discoveries with directions
simply to "apply it" is unpatentable subject matter).
249. Matthew Herder, Patents & The Progress of Personalized Medicine: Biomarkers Re-
search as Lens, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 187, 203-08 nn. 92 & 94 (2009).
250. Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at 468-69. Heightened utility standards were first prom-
ulgated in an interim form in 1999 and later finalized in 2001. Utility Examination Guide-
lines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02 (Jan. 5, 2001); Revised Utility Examination Guidelines, Request
for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 71440-01 (Dec. 21, 1999); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Reynolds, supra note 145, at 105-07; Rai, supra note 188, at 840; see also Adelman &
DeAngelis, supra note 140, at 1687-92 (noting that the number of biotech applications
granted have decreased due to the USPTO's tightened utility requirement in its 1999 Guide-
lines, among other factors).
251. Rai, supra note 188, at 840-41.
252. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 313 (6th ed. 2013); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncer-
tainty Principle, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691, 695-700 (2004); Burk & Lemley, supra note
73, at 1653-54.
253. Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at 469-70; Rai, supra note 188, at 841-43.
254. Nelson, supra note 43, at 466.
255. Reynolds, supra note 145, at 84.
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roles as both "upstream" building blocks in need of further develop-
ment into usable end products, but also as "completed" products al-
ready possessing direct and practical applications, sometimes as
commercially marketed tools for researching other subjects. 256
Many of these inventions will therefore meet even heightened
standards. On the other hand, tightening patentability standards
may reduce patent incentives, as it would affect any number of re-
searchers, not just universities and other government-funded re-
search institutions. 257 While many upstream inventions come from
government-funded basic research, others result from privately
funded investments in marketable applications. 2 58 Some truly
foundational research tools have been created by private rather
than publicly funded entities. 259 Sweeping restrictions on the pa-
tentability of upstream research may therefore have unwanted ef-
fects. 260
A possibly more tailored approach to potential hold-up problems
is to reduce transaction costs rather than to reduce the number or
scope of upstream patents. For example, many have proposed ex-
panding what is now an almost non-existent experimental-use ex-
ception in modern U.S. patent law. 2 6 1 The current exemption is ex-
tremely limited, 262 and for all intents and purposes covers only re-
search used solely for and "reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological prod-
ucts." 2 6 3 Expanding this exemption to cover experimental use of so-
called research tools would allow others to use those tools for basic
256. Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at 468.
257. Kesan, supra note 37, at 2184-85.
258. Miriam Bitton, Patenting Abstractions, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 153, 203 (2014); Eisen-
berg, supra note 134, at 1080-81.
259. Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1745, 1755 (2007).
260. Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at 468-69; see generally R. Polk Wagner, Of Patents and
Path Dependency: A Comment on Burk and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341 (2003)
(distinguishing between technology-specific "micro" levers and more generally applicable
"macro" levers for adjusting patentability and patent scope).
261. E.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at 469; Mireles, supra note 27; Mueller, supra note
138.
262. Lee, supra note 150, at 683-84 (and cases cited therein); Janice M. Mueller, The Ev-
anescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Im-
plications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917,
918 (2004); Katherine J. Strandburg, UWhat Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 81, 102.
263. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
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research, to develop other products, and to design around the pa-
tented tool without the cost of negotiating for a license, even if roy-
alty-free. 264
The main difficulty with an experimental-use exemption, how-
ever, is identifying which uses are eligible. 2 6 5 Use of a patented in-
vention for "non-commercial" reasons-i.e., for purposes other than
copying and selling the patented invention-would seem to be
harmless at first. Many a patentee would nonetheless object to the
use of his or her patented technologies to devise non-infringing al-
ternatives. These alternatives would benefit the public but could
harm the patentee by eroding the patent holder's market share and
thereby decreasing incentives to invest in inventing in the first
place. 2 6 6 Similarly, experimental use of patented research tools,
even when used to create other technologies that neither infringe
nor even compete with the patented technology, can harm the mar-
ket for the research tool, particularly if research is the only com-
mercially valuable use for the patented technology. 267 This latter
objection to an expanded experimental-use exception is particularly
salient, as industry has come to realize the value of research itself
as a form of business. 268 Finding the correct breadth of an experi-
mental-use defense therefore requires paying close attention to its
potential effects on the scientific community. 269
Alternatives similar to an experimental-use exception (but which
employ a liability-rule approach instead of an all-or-nothing, prop-
erty-rule approach) are compulsory licensing and damages instead
of injunctive relief. Like the experimental-use exception, however,
compulsory licensing and damages in lieu of injunctive relief suffer
from their own uncertainties. For example, the uncertainty of a
liability rule may actually aggravate transaction costs, 2 7 0 particu-
larly if it is difficult to predict how a court, without the benefit of
264. Dreyfuss, supra note 133, at 459-61; Mueller, supra note 138, at 4.
265. A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 100, at 110-17; Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 224.
266. Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 224-25.
267. Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 224-25; Eisenberg, supra note 134, at 1074; Wolrad
Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont, supra note 148, at 416-18 (and sources cited therein).
268. Eisenberg, supra note 134, at 1074-75; Laura G. Pedraza-Farifia, Patent Law and
the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 813, 855 (quoting and citing STEVEN SHAPIN,
THE SCIENTIFIC LIFE: A MORAL HISTORY OF A LATE MODERN VOCATION 2-3, 18-19, 97-98
(2008)). The scanning tunneling microscope, for example, was the first critical step in making
nanotechnology a practicable field but was created by researchers at IBM (albeit without
much commercial interest on the part of IBM). Cyrus C. M. Mody, Corporations, Universities,
and Instrumental Communities: Commercializing Probe Microscopy, 1981-1996, 47 TECH. &
CULTURE 56, 60 (2006).
269. Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 224.
270. Kieff, supra note 26, at 733.
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expertise in the technology, will assess an appropriate royalty
rate. 27 1
Similar uncertainty concerns may also be a problem for another
proposed solution that is built into the Bayh-Dole Act itself: a fund-
ing government agency including exercise of the "march-in" provi-
sion under Bayh-Dole. This provision allows the agency to grant
what are effectively compulsory licenses to third parties under four
circumstances: where the patentee is not expected to achieve "prac-
tical application" of the patented invention within "reasonable
time"; where necessary to address health and safety needs; where
necessary to meet requirements for public use specified under fed-
eral law; or to ensure that any manufacturing is substantially do-
mestic. 2 72 Although government agencies have been known to use
the threat of march-in rights to encourage patent licensing, 273
Bayh-Dole's march-in rights have never been exercised, perhaps
because of fears that such government action would have the over-
all effect of deterring investment in downstream development of
government-funded upstream research. 274 Government agencies
may also not be best situated to make informed and impartial deci-
sions about how to best exploit a funded invention, as university
faculty often have closer relationships with private industry and
more familiarity with the technology at issue.27 5
Private ordering is also one way to reduce transaction costs, and
is in particular an approach that can benefit from the unique posi-
tion of universities within the market place. Universities and other
patent holders can opt to contribute their patents to patent portfo-
lios, patent pools, open-source pools, collective-rights organizations,
or research and development consortia, all of which are ways of
271. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1307-16 (1996); Rai, supra note 188,
at 843.
272. 35 U.S.C. § 203; Arno & Davis, supra note 21, at 647-48 & n.93; Rai & Eisenberg,
supra note 32, at 294.
273. BNA, supra note 22, at 23.
274. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1682. A government agency also has the
right under Bayh-Dole to restrict patenting on funded research in "exceptional circum-
stances," where barring patenting "will better promote the policy and objectives" of Bayh-
Dole. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a)(ii); see also Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 293-94; Peter Lee,
Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent Law, 58
EMORY L.J. 889, 924 (2009). The elaborate administrative procedures necessary to invoke
this right are prohibitive, however. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 293.
275. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1700; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 304-05.
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making their patents more available for use. 2 7 6 For example, pa-
tents collected into patent pools and portfolios can be licensed in
one lump transaction in a way more tailored than a compulsory li-
cense because the license can be informed by the patent holders'
knowledge of the industry.277 Universities may be even more likely
than private firms to contribute their patents to a pool, as uncer-
tainty as to the value of their patents may make universities less
likely to behave strategically. 2 7 8 Forming and managing patent
pools may incur high transaction costs, however, as it is often diffi-
cult to determine which particular patents should be included in
the patent pool and how to value those patents. 279 In addition, the
uncertain value of universities' often early-stage patents could fur-
ther exacerbate these costs, as could the universities' divergent in-
terests and goals. 280 Government assistance may therefore be nec-
essary in forming patent pools, 2 8 1 but given funding agency rights
under Bayh-Dole, theoretically, at least, a government agency
might have an easier time coaxing university patents into pools
than might be the case with privately held patents. 282 The govern-
ment may nevertheless be reluctant to encourage patent pool for-
mation, as patent pools can pose antitrust concerns. 283 Thus, where
transaction costs are particularly burdensome, universities may be
better off sticking to their default and dedicating their research to
the public domain, a tactic that even many private firms have
adopted by putting their own research into public-domain consor-
tia.2 8 4
276. See APATENT SYSTEM, supra note 100, at 72; Lee, supra note 274, at 915-16; Lemley,
supra note 14, at 623-28; Merges, supra note 271 passim; Rai, supra note 188, at 845-46;
Shapiro, supra note 128, at 119.
277. Alexander Lee, Examining the Viability of Patent Pools for the Growing Nanotech-
nology Patent Thicket, 3 NANOTECH L. & Bus. 317 (2006); Merges, supra note 271, at 1295-
96. The late Professor Richard Smalley's patents on fullerenes, carbon nanotubes, and
"bucky balls" are an example of a patent portfolio. See, e.g., Donald J. Featherstone et al.,
Carbon Nanotubes: Survey of the Smalley Patent Portfolio, 9 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 35 (2012).
278. Arti K. Rai, Proprietary Rights and Collective Action: The Case of Biotechnology Re-
search with Low Commercial Value, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 288, 298-301
(Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).
279. Merges, supra note 271, at 1254-57.
280. Scott lyama, Comment: The USPTO's Proposal of a Biological Research Tool Patent
Pool Doesn't Hold Water, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1223, 1231-34 (2005); David W. Opderbeck, The
Penguin's Genome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 219-
22 (2004); Rai, supra note 188, at 846-47.
281. Merges, supra note 271, at 1356-57.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 273-274 (discussing the threat power that fund-
ing government agencies can wield under Bayh-Dole's march-in provisions).
283. Rai, supra note 188, at 848-49.
284. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 298-99. For example, the Single Nucleotide Pol-
ymorphism ("SNP") Consortium is a public-domain pool formed by the United Kingdom's
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IV. UNIVERSITY PATENTING UNDER BAYH-DOLE AS (MOSTLY)
IRRELEVANT
As this author has argued elsewhere, the most likely scenario is
that, despite the marked rise in university patenting, most of those
patents are simply not that important to downstream development,
particularly in science-based technologies. 285 When we take a closer
look, we can see that long development cycles, difficulties in attract-
ing private investment, limited access to materials and equipment,
high dependence on tacit knowledge, low expected commercial val-
ues, multidisciplinarity, and regulatory hurdles all pose much more
significant factors than upstream patents in science-based fields
such as biotechnology and nanotechnology. Science-based fields
arise from university research, but-even when present-access or
lack of access to upstream university research patents often take a
back seat to other more salient factors that are characteristic of
such technologies.
A. Science-Based Technologies Face High Technological Obsta-
cles to Development
Science-based fields often explore new areas quite different from
existing art, and patents in these fields are therefore typically com-
plex but unpredictable and embryonic, with high failure rates and
long development cycles.286 On the other hand, imitation costs in
science-based technologies are also high, creating a natural level of
non-patent exclusivity; limited supplies of necessary materials and
expertise can also obstruct entry by others. The technical barriers
and uncertainties are thus often much more rate-limiting than pa-
tents to further research and development, 287 and may explain pri-
vate industry's continued underinvestment in downstream develop-
ment of university research. 288 The following is a brief listing of
some of these technological barriers.
Wellcome Trust along with ten major pharmaceutical companies in 1999 to facilitate re-
search into large-scale associations between genotypes and disease states. Id. at 298; see
also Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 189-
90 (2004).
285. See generally Morris, supra note 15.
286. Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 880, 907-08; Mowery, supra note 46, at 44-45
(and sources cited therein); Nelson, supra note 43, at 457-59.
287. Adelman, supra note 18, at 124-25.
288. McManis & Noh, supra note 114, at 447.
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1. Tacit Knowledge
Researchers often have a tacit understanding of their art that is
too difficult to share or acquire without hands-on training to over-
come established paradigms. 289 Tacit knowledge is common in sci-
ence-based technologies, 290 where there are potentially large differ-
ences from the prior art. Tacit knowledge is critical to downstream
developments as well and requires participation by the inventing
researcher, thus limiting the potential for open competition among
downstream developers. 291 In this way tacit knowledge provides ef-
fective exclusivity that can extend and even eclipse other types of
exclusivities, including patent protection and first-mover ad-
vantages. 292 Tacit knowledge can remain tacit for only so long, how-
ever, and as understanding of a new technology matures and proce-
dures and equipment become standardized, others will gain access
to the technology. Exactly how long tacit knowledge will pose a bar-
rier to entry varies with the technology at issue. For instance, tacit
knowledge was not an issue for the widespread adoption of Colum-
bia's patented co-transformation process for producing large vol-
umes of high-quality proteins, as the biotechnology research com-
munity was able to master the process very quickly.293 Nonetheless,
at least one study suggests that, on average, the effective exclusiv-
ity based on tacit knowledge and access to research tools extends
anywhere from ten to twenty years, depending on the discipline. 294
As a means of sharing tacit knowledge, however, universities
have created technology incubators and research and science parks
to enable closer relationships between universities and private in-
dustry for joint projects, consultation, and the like. 2 9 5 University-
289. See generally Lee, supra note 13; Lee, supra note 139; see also Pedraza-Farifia, supra
note 268, at 820 (referring to the need for "intellectual migration" from one technological
paradigm and practice to another).
290. See Michael R. Darby & Lynne G. Zucker, Grilichesian Breakthroughs: Inventions of
Methods oflnventing and Firm Entry in Nanotechnology, 19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9825, 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9825; Jensen & Thursby, su-
pra note 36; Rothaermel & Thursby, supra note 87, at 833, 846-47.
291. Thursby & Thursby, supra note 121, at 1052 (and sources cites therein). Estimates
indicate that somewhere between 40% and 71% of licensed university research requires fac-
ulty involvement to be successfully commercialized. Rothaermel & Thursby, supra note 87,
at 1078-79 (and sources cited therein).
292. See generally Darby & Zucker, supra note 290; Rothaermel & Thursby, supra note
87, at 1078-79.
293. Lowe et al., supra note 131, at 158.
294. Rothaermel & Thursby, supra note 87, at 1087-88.
295. BNA, supra note 22, at 266-67; Matthew M. Mars & Sherry Hoskinson, The Organ-
izational Workshop: A Conceptual Exploration of the Boundary Spanning Role of University
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Centers, in 21 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: SPANNING BOUNDARIES AND
DISCIPLINES: UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION IN THE IDEA AGE 119 (Gary D.
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based start-up companies also have become a growing phenomenon
in the last thirty years or so, 2 9 6 and may be a useful conduit for
transferring tacit knowledge as well as providing access to research
tools and materials. 297 Faculty researchers and their graduate stu-
dents are commonly active participants in university-based start-
ups, as well as in private industry more generally, as research sci-
entists now regularly move between universities, and industry and
private firms host postdoctoral fellows. 298 Faculty relationships
with industry are often pivotal for licensing as well, and personal
relationships rather than arm's length marketing is often necessary
for the commercialization of university research. 299
2. Limited Access to Equipment and Materials
Evidence suggests that access to research materials, equipment,
and facilities can often create greater obstacles to development of
downstream applications of university research than patents do. 3 00
Universities are often perceived as surprisingly proprietary over
their materials and instruments,301 and materials transfer agree-
ments often include reach-through royalty provisions or limitations
on patenting the resulting research. 302 That being said, limitations
on sharing research materials may be due to restrictions imposed
under industry-sponsored research agreements, 303 to the need to at-
tract such industry investment, 304 to the general increase in propri-
etary attitudes accompanying the increase in patenting, or to all of
Libecap et al. eds., 2010); Rothaermel & Thursby, supra note 87passim; Siegel & Phan, supra
note 123 passim.
296. BNA, supra note 22, at 261. But see Kesan, supra note 37, at 2189 (finding evidence
that university-based start-ups remain an infrequent form of technology transfer).
297. BNA, supra note 22, at 261.
298. Lee, supra note 139, at 47; Scott Shane, Selling University Technology: Patterns from
MIT, 48 MGMT. SCI. 122 (2002).
299. Samuel Estreicher & Kristina A. Yost, University IP and the Team Production Model:
Why Change What's Not Broken?, 13-14 (N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No.
489, 2014), http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu-plltwp/489; Siegel et al., supra note 46, at 29-30.
300. Adelman, supra note 28, at 986-87; Eisenberg, supra note 134, at 1063-75; Eisen-
berg, supra note 16, at 197-205.
301. BNA, supra note 22, at 215-16.
302. Mowery & Ziedonis, supra note 113, at 159.
303. BNA, supra note 22, at 241; Katherine J. Strandburg, Sharing Research Tools and
Materials: Homo Scientificus and User Innovator Community Norms 14 (May 23, 2008) (un-
published manuscript) (electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136606 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1136606).
304. James Flanigan, Entrepreneurial Edge: Collaborating for Profits in Nanotechnology,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at B6, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/business/smallbusi-
ness/16edge.html?_r=0.
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the above. 305 The National Institutes of Health proposed standard-
ized materials transfer agreements, at least as between similarly
situated research institutions such as universities, 306 but this pro-
posal does not seem to have gained much traction. 307
That being said, industry-based "precompetitive" research and
development consortia have also recently evolved to share research
and development resources, such as research tools and materials,
as well as data. 308 These precompetitive consortia are an effective
means of providing public access to otherwise proprietary materi-
als, as the consortia allow multiple downstream developers to share
foundational resources. Precompetitive consortia are difficult to or-
ganize, however, and face steep transaction costs that may also re-
quire governmental intervention to overcome. 309 To the extent that
university-based start-ups make use of university research tools
and materials, start-ups can provide the commercial sector with at
least some, albeit again limited, access to tools and materials over
which the university might exert proprietary rights.310
3. Long Development Cycles
Research and development cycles in science-based technologies
can take many years. Taking research-intensive technologies from
laboratory proofs of concept to industrial practice, for example, of-
ten necessitates a great deal of further development to allow the
invention to be reliably reproduced and used at commercial levels
in a cost-efficient manner. 311 Patent terms last for twenty years,
but a development cycle may take so long that patents on upstream
305. BNA, supra note 22, at 429; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer of
Proprietary Research Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE
SOCIETY 223, 225 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); Mowery & Ziedonis, supra note 113,
at 159.
306. Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement: Discussion of Public Comments
Received; Publication of the Final Format of the Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 12771-01 (Mar. 8,
1995); Lee, supra note 274, at 925; Rai, supra note 3, at 113 & nn.201-04.
307. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 289, 305-06; Rai, supra note 3, at 113.
308. BNA, supra note 22, at 299; Herder, supra note 249, at 218-20; Liza S. Vertinsky,
Patents, Partnerships, and the Pre-Competitive Collaboration Myth in Pharmaceutical Inno-
vation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1509, 1553 (2015).
309. Herder, supra note 249, at 218-20.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 296-298 (discussing university-based start-ups).
311. Philip E. Auerswald & Lewis M. Branscomb, Valleys of Death and Darwinian Seas:
Financing the Invention to Innovation Transition in the United States, 28 J. TECH. TRANSFER
227, 229 (2003); Thomas A. Kalil, Nanotechnology and the 'Valley of Death,"2 NANOTECH. L.
& BUS. 265, 265-66 (2005).
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research inputs may expire in the meantime. 312 Foundational in-
ventions in particular may be used through several development
cycles, such that their patents expire long before their utility
does. 313 In the meantime, both patentees and potential infringers
may simply overlook patent rights in the name of research. In fact,
lengthy time lags and long development cycles are common to many
research-based fields such as physics, mathematics, and the physi-
cal sciences. 314 Long development cycles, significant technical bar-
riers, and the consequent uncertainty inherent in development of
science-based technologies can slow research and development
much more than patents can.3 15
B. Science-Based Technologies Face High Non-Technological Ob-
stacles to Development
Given the long development cycles common in science-based tech-
nologies, potential investors may often be nervous about when de-
velopment will be complete and when they can begin to see returns
on their investments. Given science-based technologies' complexity
and its dependence on access to materials, equipment, and faculty
expertise, investors may also be nervous that these technological
hurdles will prevent development from being completed at all. All
of the uncertainties inherent in the development process make
these fields unattractive investment risks. 316 Even if and when de-
velopment is complete, applications stemming from science-based
technologies may still encounter other hurdles. Because science-
based technologies often present a leap from known technologies,
development in these fields may face further uncertainty about not
only market appeal but also other issues, such as health and safety
ramifications. 3 1 7 Whether an invention is successfully commercial-
ized often depends not so much on the technological or other merits
312. Adelman, supra note 28, at 1015-16; Sichelman, supra note 7, at 366.
313. Adelman, supra note 28, at 1015-16.
314. Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 880; Mowery, supra note 46, at 43.
315. Adelman, supra note 18, at 124-25.
316. Mowery, supra note 46, at 42-43 (and sources cited therein); Ramirez, supra note 86,
at 378; ChunHsien Wang et al., A Study of Nanotechnology R&D Alliance Networking, 2012
PROC. PICMET'12: TECH. MGMT. FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 3497 passim.
317. For example, well-known nanotechnology pioneer Eric Drexler opines that the possi-
bility of regulatory restrictions and potential liability for consumer, environmental, or other
harms have led to public fears and lack of enthusiasm for the field and negatively influenced
private and even government funding in nanotech R&D. K. ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF
CREATION: THE COMING ERA OF NANOTECHNOLOGY (1st ed. 1986).
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of an invention but on concurrent developments, industry condi-
tions, and the existence of complementary goods and services. 318
These additional uncertainties make investments in these areas
even more unattractive-indeed, the difficulties of attracting inter-
est and investment in science-based technologies are frequently a
much more intractable problem than is the need to license up-
stream or complementary patents.319 Patents and transaction costs
undoubtedly exacerbate the difficulties of developing complex tech-
nologies, but what may most deter private capital from investing in
science-based technologies is the complexity and uncertainty inher-
ent in much of the downstream development in these fields. Indeed,
identifying potential licensees is one of the most difficult obstacles
for TTOs to overcome. 320
Venture capitalists and other investors generally will not invest
in the early stages of technologies with long R&D cycles, preferring
to wait until development projects are closer to completion in order
to minimize risk and maximize the time-value of their funds. 321
University inventions in particular suffer from higher failure
rates, 3 2 2 with up to half of all university inventions failing during
commercialization. 32 3 University patents are often so embryonic
that the expected value of any possible commercial end products
will be too low to attract private industry interest. 32 4 Under these
circumstances, private industry, angel investors, venture capital-
ists, and others are understandably reluctant to invest until they
have further information on the potential commercial value of de-
veloping upstream research. 325 The information gap between pri-
318. Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 1071; Siegel & Phan, supra note 123 passim (noting
effect of these factors on success in commercializing university inventions).
319. Cf. Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1622-23 (noting that earlier patents on now-
obsolete software can still hinder future development because of software's short life cycle).
320. Osenga, supra note 29, at 421.
321. George S. Ford et al., A Valley of Death in the Innovation Sequence: An Economic
Investigation, 4 (Phx. Ctr. for Advanced Legal & Econ. Pub. Pol'y Studies, Discussion Paper,
2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093006; Frischmann, supra note 31, at 172 (noting private
discount rates are higher than social discount rates); Rachel Lorey Allen, Venture Capital
Investment in Nanotechnology, JONES DAY PRACTICE PERSPECTIVES: NANOTECHNOLOGY,
available at http://www.jonesday.com/practiceperspectives/nanotechnology/venture-capi-
tal.html (last visited Jan 5, 2016).
322. Rothaermel & Thursby, supra note 87, at 1078.
323. Emmanuel Dechenaux et al., Appropriability and Commercialization: Evidence from
MIT Inventions, 54 MGMT. SCI. 893, 894 (2008).
324. Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 1094; Rothaermel & Thursby, supra note 87, at 1078.
325. See, e.g., Stuart J. H. Graham & Maurizio lacopetta, Nanotechnology and the Emer-
gence of a General Purpose Technology, 115-116 ANNALS ECON. & STAT. 5, 8-9 (2014); Atul
Nerkar & Scott Shane, Determinants of Invention Commercialization: An Empirical Exami-
nation of Academically Sourced Inventions, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1155 passim (2007).
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vate interests and university researchers can thus create insur-
mountable obstacles to downstream development, a transaction
cost independent of any patent protection. Only over time, as the
perceived risk attenuates, do venture capitalists and other poten-
tial investors develop the necessary comfort level to invest in fun-
damentally new technologies. The resulting gap in investment be-
tween upstream research and downstream end products in the
meantime is often referred to as the "valley of death," a well-recog-
nized problem for science-based technologies. 326
For development projects that are too uncertain and risky to at-
tract private funding, several agencies now offer government fund-
ing. 32 7 Enacted in 1982, the Small Business Innovation Research
("SBIR") program allows federal agencies to grant funds to small
businesses for the commercialization of government-sponsored
R&D. 3 2 8 The Small Business Technology Transfer ("STTR") sub-
part of SBIR also funds collaborations between private industry and
nonprofit educational and research facilities. 329 In the late 1980s,
Congress also created the Advanced Technology Program ("ATP")
to provide matching funds for private investments in early-stage
technological developments that face significant risk but are likely
to yield significant broad-based benefits.330 Overall, government
funding steps in to provide about twenty to twenty-five percent of
all funds for early-stage technology development, 331 with state gov-
ernments also increasingly providing public funds for the same pur-
poses, such as funding university start-ups. 332
And to a lesser extent, university-based start-ups may also help
bridge the valley of death. Although larger (or at least established)
firms might have more expertise in commercializing and marketing
generally,333 start-ups offer their own advantages. 334 University
start-ups generally are more nimble and less risk-averse than both
universities and larger firms, 3 3 5 and to the extent that they are
326. Gunter Festel et al., Importance and Best Practice of Early Stage Nanotechnology
Investments, 7 NANOTECH. L. & Bus. 50, 58 (2010); Kalil, supra note 311.
327. BNA, supra note 22, at 285-86.
328. Kalil, supra note 311, at 267.
329. BNA, supra note 22, at 285; Liza Vertinsky, Universities as Guardians of Their In-
ventions, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1949, 2007.
330. Kalil, supra note 311, at 266; Charles W. Wessner, Driving Innovations Across the
Valley of Death, 48 RES.-TECH. MGMT. 9, 9-10 (2005).
331. Auerswald & Branscomb, supra note 311, at 232.
332. Michael MacRae, Commercializing University Research, AM. Soc'Y MECH. ENG'RS
(Mar. 2011), https://www.asme.org/engineering-topics/articles/high-tech-startups/commer-
cializing-university-research.
333. BNA, supra note 22, at 261-62.
334. Chukumba & Jensen, supra note 159, at 4, 21 (and sources cited therein).
335. BNA, supra note 22, at 261-62; Rothaermel & Thursby, supra note 87, at 1087.
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funded through alternatives to private investment, university
start-ups also represent an intermediate step that can lessen the
risk of later commercialization investments. 336 Currently only a
small percentage of licensed university research is introduced
through start-ups rather than through more established firms, alt-
hough the numbers may be growing. 337
Overall, the relative unimportance of patents to the likelihood of
development of university research helps explain why so little of
eligible university research is patented, much less licensed. 338
Moreover, to the extent that universities do opt to patent, many of
those patents will probably not be worth maintaining; universities
may often decide to allow their patents to fall into the public domain
through failure to pay maintenance fees on the patents. 339 For ex-
ample, Pennsylvania State University recently auctioned fifty-nine
of its engineering patent portfolios that it had been unable to li-
cense. The auction yielded buyers for only two of its patents, but
the university noted that the auction was nonetheless a useful in-
sight into which patents the university would now consider allow-
ing to lapse due to non-payment of maintenance fees. 340 Indeed,
Professor Kimberly Moore's study of renewal rates for patents is-
sued in 1991 suggests that early-stage patents display higher non-
renewal rates where development costs are high and where private
industry shows little interest. 341
V. CONCLUSION
The question of whether the Bayh-Dole Act and the consequent
rise in university patenting are worth the costs is a highly relevant
336. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 698.
337. MILLER ET AL., supra note 186, at 33-37; Mowery, supra note 46, at 53.
338. Love, supra note 17, at 303-04; Walsh et al., supra note 100, at 309.
339. Cf. Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 1521 (2005) (using
failure to pay maintenance fees as measure of patent value). Increasing maintenance fees
must be paid at 3.5 years, 7.5 years, and 11.5 years after a patent is issued; failure to pay
any of these fees leads to patent expiration in six months. Id. at 1525.
340. Goldie Blumenstyk, Penn State's Patent Auction Produces More Lessons Than Reve-
nue, CHRON. HIGHER ED., (May 1, 2014) http://chronicle.com/blogs/bottomline/penn-states-
patent-auction-produces-more-lessons-than-revenue/; Neil Kane, Patents for Sale: How to
Separate the Valuable from the Worthless, FORBES, (May 22, 2014, 10:35 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/neilkane/ 2014/05/22/a-modest-proposal-for-licensing-patents/.
One of the reasons that Penn State sold so few patents may have been the restrictions that
the university placed on the auction to prevent so-called patent trolls-non-practicing enti-
ties that use patents to extract rents from unknowing infringers-from acquiring the patents.
Id. Cf NRC, supra note 102, at 6 (advocating against university patent sales to patent ag-
gregators and other non-practicing entities).
341. Moore, supra note 339, at 1534, 1544, 1547-48 (noting this phenomenon in biotech,
pharmaceutical and chemical fields).
Winter 2016 129
Duquesne Law Review
one, as a variety of national as well as state governments have im-
plemented legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act. 3 42 If patenting
does in fact encourage the application and commercialization of uni-
versity research as intended, then the Bayh-Dole Act is perhaps
worth replicating. The public may be "paying twice" for govern-
ment-funded research as a result, but better that the public should
pay twice and receive the benefit of that research in terms of usea-
ble applications, than to receive no such benefit because no one was
willing to invest in developing those applications. If, on the other
hand, university patents cause the opposite effect by creating anti-
commons and other obstacles to downstream development, as many
critics fear, then perhaps Bayh-Dole, patent law, or both ought to
be modified accordingly. It is entirely possible and perhaps proba-
ble, however, that upstream patenting is simply unimportant and
does little or nothing either to facilitate or to frustrate the commer-
cialization of government-funded research, and that other factors
are more determinative of whether upstream research will be de-
veloped into marketable applications. If university and other up-
stream research patents have so little effect, then the various con-
cerns about, and proposed solutions to, the perceived problems with
the Bayh-Dole Act are beside the point. All the same, this rather
simple summary of the issues misses a couple of crucial considera-
tions.
First, and most importantly, university research is variable in its
characteristics; in science-based fields, research tends to be very
early-stage and uncertain in value, but in more applied fields, such
as engineering, research may be closer to a ready-to-apply form.
Likewise, downstream development of university research is highly
variable and cannot be expected to follow any uniform pattern. 3 4 3
Which of the three scenarios presented above will obtain for any
given downstream application will depend on a number of varia-
bles, of which university patenting under the Bayh-Dole Act is
merely one of many. The effect of the Bayh-Dole Act and its related
statutes are therefore hardly monolithic in their effect and will vary
greatly across technologies and developmental pathways. 3 44
342. Mireles, supra note 27, at 265; Osenga, supra note 29, at 417; Estreicher & Yost,
supra note 299, at 24.
343. Cf. Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1577 ("Technology is anything but uniform ...
[and] ... demonstrates deep structural differences in how industries innovate."); Merges &
Nelson, supra note 58, at 843, 866-67 (effect of upstream patenting varies with technology
in question).
344. Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1584-87; Frischmann, supra note 31, at 156-57;
Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 843 ("[T]he issues at stake regarding patent scope depend
on the nature of technology in an industry.").
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Second, the scenarios described above are not mutually exclusive
of one another. Development of one particular application may be
held up by both lack of funding and lack of access to patented re-
search tools if the downstream firm does not receive the blessing of
the inventing faculty member, whereas development of a different
application of that same technology may be facilitated by access to
both tacit knowledge and relevant upstream patent rights if the
downstream firm has an established relationship with the invent-
ing faculty member. The effect of upstream research patenting de-
pends greatly on the nature of the particular end product at issue,
as well as the nature of the market into which that product will be
introduced. 345 And, of course, the nature of the specific upstream
invention to be developed into an end product will also influence its
downstream path. 3 4 6 Indeed, any given development project might
fall into more than one of the scenarios described above, depending
on which part of the end product and its innovation cycle one fo-
cuses. Part of a product may have necessitated the coordination of
multiple patents, while other parts involve significant tacit infor-
mation, and yet other parts may depend on significant pre- and
post-invention investments attracted by strong upstream patent
rights. A few generalizations nonetheless can be made.
First, patents on upstream university research may be particu-
larly valuable where commercialization costs are high, where nei-
ther cumulative nor complementary innovation are prevalent, and
where imitation costs are particularly low. 3 4 7 The potential for pa-
tent exclusivity may also help attract private investment both in
the pre-invention and post-invention stages, while the addition of
some level of government funding may help reduce the risk of such
investments, further incentivizing private funding.
Second, patents on "basic" or "upstream" research will not neces-
sarily have enough preemptive breadth to create a risk of patent-
induced hold-up problems. 348 Upstream patents may require a good
deal of downstream development to be of commercial value, but still
can be easily designed around or replaced with meaningful substi-
tutes. 3 4 9 A patent that covers one of the few foundational or "com-
mon-method research tools," on the other hand, can have significant
345. See generally Graham & Iacopetta, supra note 325; Mossoff, supra note 167, at 204.
346. Nerkar & Shane, supra note 325, at 1163.
347. Burk & Lemley, supra note 73, at 1615-17; Kieff, supra note 26, at 747.
348. Adelman, supra note 28, at 1021.
349. See Kieff, supra note 26, at 730-31 (noting that the availability of market alterna-
tives limits patent holders' power to set price).
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preemptive power on a wide range of downstream developments. 3 50
Foundational research tools may also be the least likely to need ex-
clusivity as a means of protecting and incentivizing further devel-
opment in order to be adopted by others and commercialized. 3 5 1
Thus, if such foundational but "ready to use" research tools have
been invented using government funds, the argument for intellec-
tual property protection after the fact is particularly lacking; at the
very least, broad and low-royalty licensing should be strongly en-
couraged.
Third, risk-aversion and the valley of death as well as other ob-
stacles unrelated to patenting play significant roles in the develop-
ment of science-based technologies. Where access to materials,
tools, and tacit knowledge are more rate-limiting than patents,
greater emphasis should be placed on creating depositories or con-
sortia to provide wider access to these resources. And although the
Bayh-Dole Act tried to address mismanagement of upstream re-
search by privatizing its ownership, perhaps more government sup-
port, such as further funding to close the valley of death, rather
than privatization through patenting, is the more effective solution.
350. Adelman, supra note 28, at 1020-21. Similarly, the cost of licensing patented diag-
nostic tests and other "downstream" technologies can often be prohibitive in clinical research.
A PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 100, at 73; NRC, supra note 102, at 39-40.
351. Colyvas et al., supra note 46, at 65.
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